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Abstract—Deep learning approaches to anomaly detection have
recently improved the state of the art in detection performance
on complex datasets such as large collections of images or text.
These results have sparked a renewed interest in the anomaly
detection problem and led to the introduction of a great variety
of new methods. With the emergence of numerous such methods,
including approaches based on generative models, one-class
classification, and reconstruction, there is a growing need to bring
methods of this field into a systematic and unified perspective. In
this review we aim to identify the common underlying principles
as well as the assumptions that are often made implicitly by
various methods. In particular, we draw connections between
classic ‘shallow’ and novel deep approaches and show how this
relation might cross-fertilize or extend both directions. We fur-
ther provide an empirical assessment of major existing methods
that is enriched by the use of recent explainability techniques, and
present specific worked-through examples together with practical
advice. Finally, we outline critical open challenges and identify
specific paths for future research in anomaly detection.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, deep anomaly detection,
deep learning, interpretability, kernel methods, neural networks,
novelty detection, one-class classification, out-of-distribution de-
tection, outlier detection, unsupervised learning
I. INTRODUCTION
An anomaly is an observation that deviates considerably
from some concept of normality. Also known as outlier
or novelty, such an observation may be termed unusual,
irregular, atypical, inconsistent, unexpected, rare, erroneous,
faulty, fraudulent, malicious, unnatural, or simply strange —
depending on the situation. Anomaly detection (or outlier de-
tection or novelty detection) is the research area that studies the
detection of such anomalous observations through methods,
models, and algorithms based on data. Classic approaches
to anomaly detection include Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [1]–[5], the One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-
SVM) [6], Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) [7],
* Corresponding authors: M. Kloft, T. G. Dietterich, and K.-R. Mu¨ller.
L. Ruff, J. R. Kauffmann, R. A. Vandermeulen, and G. Montavon are with
the ML group, Technische Universita¨t Berlin, 10587 Berlin, Germany.
W. Samek is with the Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute, 10587 Berlin,
Germany.
M. Kloft is with the Dept. of Computer Science, Technische Universita¨t
Kaiserslautern, 67653 Kaiserslautern, Germany (e-mail: kloft@cs.uni-kl.de).
T. G. Dietterich is with the School of Electrical Engineering and Com-
puter Science, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331, USA (e-mail:
tgd@cs.orst.edu).
K.-R. Mu¨ller is with Google Research, Brain team, Berlin, Germany and the
ML group, Technische Universita¨t Berlin, 10587 Berlin, Germany, and also
with the Dept. of Artificial Intelligence, Korea University, Seoul 136-713,
South Korea and Max Planck Institute for Informatics, 66123 Saarbru¨cken,
Germany (e-mail: klaus-robert.mueller@tu-berlin.de).
nearest neighbor algorithms [8]–[10], and Kernel Density
Estimation (KDE) [11], [12].
What the above methods have in common is that they are all
unsupervised, which constitutes the predominant approach to
anomaly detection. This is because labeled anomalous data is
often non-existent. When available, it is usually insufficient to
represent the diversity of all potential anomalies. This prohibits
or renders a supervised approach ineffective. Instead, a central
idea in anomaly detection is to learn a model of normality
from normal data in an unsupervised manner, so that anomalies
become detectable through deviations from such a model.
The study of anomaly detection has a long history and spans
multiple disciplines including engineering, machine learning,
data mining, and statistics. While the first formal definitions
of so-called ‘discordant observations’ date back to the 19th
century [13], the problem of anomaly detection has likely
been studied informally even earlier, since anomalies are
phenomena that naturally occur in diverse academic disciplines
such as medicine and the natural sciences. Anomalous data
may be useless, for example when caused by measurement
errors, or may be extremely informative and hold the key
to new insights, such as very long surviving cancer patients.
Kuhn [14] claims that persistent anomalies drive scientific
revolutions (cf., section VI ‘Anomaly and the Emergence of
Scientific Discoveries’ in [14]).
Anomaly detection today has numerous applications across
a variety of domains. Examples include intrusion detection in
cybersecurity [15]–[20], fraud detection in finance, insurance,
healthcare, and telecommunication [21]–[27], industrial fault
and damage detection [28]–[36], the monitoring of infrastruc-
ture [37], [38] and stock markets [39], [40], acoustic novelty
detection [41]–[45], medical diagnosis [46]–[61] and disease
outbreak detection [47], [62], event detection in the earth
sciences [63]–[68], and scientific discovery in chemistry [69],
[70], bioinformatics [71], genetics [72], [73], physics [74],
[75], and astronomy [76]–[79]. The data available in these
domains is continually growing in size. It is also growing
to include complex data types such as images, video, audio,
text, graphs, multivariate time series, and biological sequences,
among others. For applications to be successful on such com-
plex and high-dimensional data, a meaningful representation
of the data is crucial [80].
Deep learning [81]–[83] follows the idea of learning ef-
fective representations from the data itself by training flex-
ible, multi-layered (‘deep’) neural networks and has greatly
improved the state of the art in many applications that
involve complex data types. Deep neural networks provide
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2the most successful solutions for many tasks in domains
such as computer vision [84]–[93], speech recognition [94]–
[103], or natural language processing [104]–[113], and have
contributed to the sciences [114]–[123]. Methods based on
deep neural networks are able to exploit the hierarchical or
latent structure that is often inherent to data through their
multi-layered, distributed feature representations. Advances in
parallel computation, stochastic gradient descent optimization,
and automated differentiation make it possible to apply deep
learning at scale using large datasets.
Recently, there has been a rapidly growing interest in
developing deep learning approaches for anomaly detection.
This is motivated by a lack of effective methods for anomaly
detection tasks which involve complex data, for instance
cancer detection from multi-gigapixel whole-slide images in
histopathology. As in other adoptions of deep learning, the am-
bition of deep anomaly detection is to mitigate the burden of
manual feature engineering and to enable effective as well as
scalable solutions. However, unlike supervised deep learning,
it is less clear what characterizes an effective learning objective
for anomaly detection and which signals should be used for
learning a representation due to the mostly unsupervised nature
of the problem.
The major approaches to deep anomaly detection include
deep autoencoder variants [44], [52], [55], [124]–[134], deep
one-class classification [135]–[144], methods based on deep
generative models such as Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) [51], [57], [145]–[152], as well as recent self-
supervised methods [153]–[156]. In comparison to traditional
anomaly detection methods, where a feature representation is
fixed a priori (e.g., via a kernel feature map), these approaches
aim to learn a feature map of the data φω : x 7→ φω(x), a
deep neural network parameterized with weights ω, as part of
their learning objective.
Due to the long history and diversity of anomaly detection,
there exists a wealth of review and survey literature [157]–
[176] as well as books [177]–[179] on the topic. Some very
recent surveys focus specifically on deep anomaly detection
[180]–[182], but these works exclusively consider the deep
learning approaches themselves. An integrated treatment of
deep learning methods in the overall context of anomaly
detection research — in particular its kernel-based learning part
[6], [183], [184] — is still missing.
In this review paper, our aim is to exactly fill this gap by
presenting a unifying view that connects traditional shallow
and novel deep learning approaches. We will summarize recent
exciting developments, present different classes of anomaly
detection methods, provide theoretical insights, and highlight
the current best practices when applying anomaly detection.
Note finally, that we do not attempt an encyclopedic treatment
of all available anomaly detection literature; rather, we present
a slightly biased point of view illustrating the main ideas (and
in doing so we often draw from the work of the authors) and
providing ample reference to related work for further reading.
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Fig. 1. Anomaly detection approaches placed in the plane spanned by two
major components of our unifying view. Besides Model and Feature Map, we
identify Loss, Regularization, and Inference Mode as other important modeling
components of the anomaly detection problem.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO ANOMALY DETECTION
A. Why Should We Care About Anomaly Detection?
Anomaly detection is part of our daily lives. Operating
mostly unnoticed, anomaly detection algorithms are contin-
uously monitoring our credit card payments, our login behav-
iors, and companies’ communication networks. If they detect
an abnormally expensive purchase made on our credit card,
several unsuccessful login attempts made from an alien device
in a distant country, or unusual ftp requests made to our
computer, they will issue an alarm. While warnings such as
“someone is trying to login to your account” can be annoying
when you are on a business trip abroad and just want to
check your e-mails from the hotel computer, the ability to
detect such anomalous patterns is vital for a large number of
today’s applications and services and even small improvements
in anomaly detection can lead to immense monetary savings1.
In addition, the ability to detect anomalies is also considered
an important ingredient in ensuring fail-safe and robust design
of deep learning-based systems, e.g. in medical applications or
autonomous driving. Various international standardization ini-
tiatives have been launched towards this goal (e.g., ITU/WHO
FG-AI4H, ISO/IEC CD TR 24029-1, or IEEE P7009).
Despite its importance, discovering a reliable distinction
between ‘normal’ and ‘anomalous’ events is a challenging
task. First, the variability within the normal data can be very
large, resulting in misclassifying normal samples as being
anomalous (type I error) or not identifying the anomalous
ones (type II error). Especially in biological or biomedical
datasets, the variability between the normal data (e.g., person-
to-person variability) is often as large or even larger than
the distance to anomalous samples (e.g., patients). Preprocess-
ing, normalization, and feature selection are potential means
to reduce this variability and improve detectability. Second,
anomalous events are often very rare, which results in highly
imbalanced training datasets. Even worse, in most cases the
datasets are unlabeled, so that it remains unclear which data
points are regarded anomalies and why. Hence, the anomaly
1In 2019, UK’s online banking fraud has been estimated to be 111.8 million
GBP (source: https://www.statista.com/).
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detection problem reduces to an unsupervised learning task
with the goal to learn a valid model of the majority of data
points. Finally, anomalies themselves can be very diverse, so
that it becomes difficult to learn a complete model for them.
Also here the solution is to learn a model for the normal
samples and treat deviations from it as anomalies. However,
this approach can be problematic if the distribution of the
(normal) data changes (non-stationarity), either intrinsically
or due to environmental changes (e.g., lighting conditions,
recording devices from different manufacturers, etc.).
As exemplified and discussed above, we note that anomaly
detection has a broad practical relevance and impact. More-
over, (accidentally) detecting the unknown unknowns [185] has
always been a strong driving force in the sciences. If applied
to these disciplines, anomaly detection can help us to identify
new, previously unknown patterns in data, which can lead to
novel scientific insights and hypotheses.
B. A Formal Definition of the Problem
In the following, we formally introduce the anomaly de-
tection problem. We first define in probabilistic terms what
an anomaly is, explain what types of anomalies there are,
and delineate the subtle differences between an anomaly,
an outlier, and a novelty. Finally we present a fundamental
principle in anomaly detection — the so-called concentration
assumption — and give a theoretical problem formulation that
corresponds to density level set estimation.
1) What is an Anomaly?: We opened this review with the
following definition:
An anomaly is an observation that deviates consid-
erably from some concept of normality.
To formalize this definition, we here specify two aspects
more precisely: a ‘concept of normality’ and what ‘deviates
considerably’ signifies. Following many previous authors [13],
[177], [186]–[188], we rely on probability theory.
Let X ⊆ RD be the data space given by some task
or application. We define a concept of normality as the
distribution P+ on X that captures the ground-truth law of
normal behavior in a given task or application. An observation
that deviates considerably from such a law of normality —an
anomaly— is then a data point x ∈ X (or set of points) that
lies in a low probability region under P+. Assuming that P+
has a corresponding probability density function (pdf) p+(x),
we can define the set of anomalies as
A = {x ∈ X | p+(x) ≤ τ}, τ ≥ 0, (1)
where τ ≥ 0 is some threshold such that the probability of
A under P+ is ‘sufficiently small’ which we will discuss in
further detail below.
2) Types of Anomalies: Various types of anomalies have
been identified in the literature [161], [179]. These include
point anomalies, conditional or contextual anomalies [169],
[171], [190]–[194], and group or collective anomalies [146],
[192], [195]–[198]. We extend these three established types
by further adding low-level, sensory anomalies and high-level,
semantic anomalies [199], a distinction that is particularly
relevant for choosing between deep and shallow feature maps.
Point Anomaly
Group Anomaly
Low-level, Texture Anomaly
Contextual Point Anomaly
Contextual Group Anomaly
High-level, Semantic Anomaly
Fig. 2. An illustration of the types of anomalies: A point anomaly is a single
anomalous point. A contextual point anomaly occurs if a point deviates in
its local context, here a spike in an otherwise normal time series. A group
anomaly can be a cluster of anomalies or some series of related points that
is anomalous under the joint series distribution (contextual group anomaly).
Note that both contextual anomalies have values that fall into the global (time-
integrated) range of normal values. A low-level, sensory anomaly deviates
in the low-level features, here a cut in the fabric texture of a carpet [189].
A semantic anomaly deviates in high-level factors of variation or semantic
concepts, here a dog among the normal class of cats. Note that the white cat
is more similar to the dog than to the other cats in low-level pixel space.
A point anomaly is an individual anomalous data point
x ∈ A, for example an illegal transaction in fraud detection
or an image of a damaged product in manufacturing. This
is arguably the most commonly studied type in anomaly
detection research.
A conditional or contextual anomaly is a data instance
that is anomalous in a specific context such as time, space,
or the connections in a graph. A price of $1 per Apple
Inc. stock might have been normal before 1997, but as of
today (2020) would be an anomaly. A mean daily temperature
below freezing point would be an anomaly in the Amazon
rainforest, but not in the Antarctic desert. For this anomaly
type, the normal law P+ is more precisely a conditional
distribution P+ ≡ P+X|T with conditional pdf p+(x | t) that
depends on some contextual variable T . Time series anomalies
[169], [194], [200]–[203] are the most prominent example of
contextual anomalies. Other examples include spatial [204],
[205], spatio-temporal [191], or graph-based [171], [206],
[207] anomalies.
A group or collective anomaly is a set of related or
dependent points {xj ∈ X | j ∈ J} that is anomalous,
where J ⊆ N is an index set that captures some relation or
dependency. A cluster of anomalies such as similar or related
network attacks in cybersecurity form a collective anomaly
for instance [18], [207], [208]. Often, collective anomalies are
also contextual such as anomalous time (sub-)series or bio-
logical (sub-)sequences, for example, some series or sequence
{xt, . . . ,xt+s−1} of length s ∈ N. It is important to note
that although each individual point xj in such a series or
sequence might be normal under the time-integrated marginal
p+(x) =
∫
p+(x, t) dt or under the sequence-integrated, time-
4conditional marginal p+(x | t) given by∫
···
∫
p+(xt, ... ,xt+s−1 | t) dxt···dxj−1 dxj+1··· dxt+s−1
the full series or sequence {xt, . . . ,xt+s−1} can be anoma-
lous under the joint conditional density p+(xt, . . . ,xt+s−1 | t),
which properly describes the distribution of the collective
series or sequences.
In the wake of deep learning, the distinction between low-
level, sensory anomalies and high-level, semantic anomalies
[199] has become important. Low and high here refer to the
level in the feature hierarchy of some hierarchical distribution,
for instance, the hierarchy from pixel-level features such as
edges and textures to high-level objects and scenes in images
or the hierarchy from individual characters and words to
semantic concepts and topics in texts. It is commonly assumed
that data with such a hierarchical structure is generated from
some semantic latent variables Z and Y that describe higher-
level factors of variation Z (e.g., the shape, size or orientation
of an object) and concepts Y (e.g., the object class identity)
[80], [209]. We can express this via a normal law with
conditional pdf p+(x | z, y), where we usually assume Z to be
continuous and Y to be discrete. Low-level anomalies can for
example be texture defects or artifacts in images, or character
typos in words. In comparison, semantic anomalies can be
images of objects from non-normal classes [199], for instance,
or misposted reviews and news articles [139]. Note that
semantic anomalies can be very close to normal instances in
the raw feature space X . For example a dog with a fur texture
and color similar to that of some cat can be more similar
in raw pixel space than various cat breeds among themselves
(cf., Fig. 2). Similarly, low-level background statistics can also
result in a high similarity in raw pixel space even when objects
in the foreground are completely different [199]. Detecting
semantic anomalies is thus innately tied to finding a semantic
feature representation (e.g., extracting the semantic features of
cats such as whiskers, slit pupils, triangular snout, etc.), which
is an inherently difficult task in an unsupervised setting [209].
3) Anomaly, Outlier, or Novelty?: Some works make a
more subtle distinction between what is an anomaly, an outlier,
or a novelty. While all three refer to instances from low
probability regions under P+ (i.e., are elements of A), an
anomaly is often characterized as being an instance from a
distinct distribution other than P+ (e.g., when anomaly points
are generated by a different process than the normal points),
an outlier as being a rare or low-probability instance from
P+, and a novelty as being an instance from some new
region or mode of an evolving, non-stationary P+. Under
the distribution P+ of cats, for instance, a dog would be an
anomaly, a rare breed of cats such as the LaPerm would
be an outlier, and a new breed of cats would be a novelty.
Such a distinction between anomaly, outlier, and novelty may
reflect slightly different objectives in an application: whereas
anomalies are often the data points of interest (e.g., a long-
term survivor of a disease), outliers are frequently regarded
as ‘noise’ or ‘measurement error’ that should be removed in
a data preprocessing step (‘outlier removal’), and novelties
are new observations that require models to be updated to
the ‘new normal’. The methods for detecting points from
low probability regions, whether termed anomaly, outlier, or
novelty, are usually the same however. For this reason, we
do not make such a distinction here and refer to any instance
x ∈ A as an anomaly.
4) The Concentration Assumption: In general, the data
space X ⊆ RD can be unbounded. A fundamental assumption
in anomaly detection however is that the region where the
normal data lives can be bounded. That is, that there exists
some threshold τ ≥ 0 such that
X \ A = {x ∈ X | p+(x) > τ} (2)
is non-empty and small (typically in the Lebesgue-measure
sense). This is known as the so-called concentration or cluster
assumption [210]–[212]. Note that the concentration assump-
tion does not imply that the full support supp(p+) = {x ∈
X | p+(x) > 0} of the normal law P+ must be bounded; only
that some high-density subset of the support is bounded. A
standard univariate Gaussian is supported on the full real axis,
for example, but approximately 95% of the most likely region
is covered by the bounded interval [−1.96, 1.96]. In contrast,
the set of anomalies A need not be concentrated and can be
unbounded.
5) Density Level Set Estimation: A law of normality P+ is
only known in a few application settings, such as for certain
laws of physics. Sometimes a concept of normality might also
be user-specified (as in juridical laws). In most cases, however,
the ground-truth law of normality P+ is unknown because the
underlying process is too complex. For this reason, we must
estimate P+ from data.
Let P be the ground-truth data-generating distribution on
data space X ⊆ RD with corresponding density p(x). For
now, we assume that this data-generating distribution exactly
matches the normal data distribution, i.e. P ≡ P+ and p ≡
p+. This assumption is often invalid in practice, of course,
as the data-generating process might be subject to noise or
contamination as we will discuss in the next section.
Given data points x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X generated by P (usually
assumed to be drawn from i.i.d. random variables following
P), the goal of anomaly detection is to learn a model that
allows us to predict whether a new test instance x˜ ∈ X (or
set of test instances) is an anomaly or not, i.e. whether x˜ ∈
A. Thus the anomaly detection objective is to (explicitly or
implicitly) estimate the low-density regions (or equivalently
high-density regions) in data space X under the normal law
P+. We can formally express this objective as the problem of
density level set estimation [213]–[216] which is an instance
of minimum volume set estimation [217]–[219] for the special
case of density-based sets. The density level set of P for some
threshold τ ≥ 0 is given by C = {x ∈ X | p(x) > τ}. For
some fixed level α ∈ [0, 1], the α-density level set Cα of
distribution P is then defined as the smallest density level set
C that has a probability of at least 1− α under P, i.e.
Cα = arginf
C
{λ(C) |P(C) ≥ 1− α}
= {x ∈ X | p(x) > τα}
(3)
where τα ≥ 0 denotes the corresponding threshold and λ
typically is the Lebesgue measure, which is the standard
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the density level sets of a univariate (left) and
bivariate (right) standard Gaussian distribution.
measure of volume in Euclidean space. The extreme cases
of α = 0 and α → 1 result in the full support C0 =
{x ∈ X | p(x) > 0} = supp(p) and the most likely
modes argmaxx p(x) of P respectively. If the aforementioned
concentration assumption holds, there always exists some level
α such that a corresponding level set Cα exists and can be
bounded. Fig. 3 illustrates some density level sets for the case
that P is the familiar standard Gaussian distribution. Given a
level set Cα, we can define a corresponding threshold anomaly
detector cα : X → {±1} as
cα(x) =
{
+1 if x ∈ Cα,
−1 if x 6∈ Cα. (4)
6) Density Estimation for Level Set Estimation: An obvious
approach to density level set estimation is through density
estimation. Given some estimated density model pˆ(x) =
pˆ(x; x1, . . . ,xn) ≈ p(x) and some target level α ∈ [0, 1], one
can estimate a corresponding threshold τˆα via the empirical
p-value function:
τˆα = inf
τ
{
τ ≥ 0 ∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1[0,pˆ(xi))(τ) ≥ 1− α
}
, (5)
where 1A(·) denotes the indicator function for some set A.
Using τˆα and pˆ(x) in (3) yields the plug-in density level set
estimator Cˆα which in turn can be used in (4) to obtain the
plug-in threshold detector cˆα(x). Note however that density
estimation is generally the most costly approach to density
level set estimation (in terms of samples required), since
estimating the full density is equivalent to first estimating
the entire family of level sets {Cα : α ∈ [0, 1]} from
which the desired level set for some fixed α ∈ [0, 1] is then
selected [220], [221]. If there are insufficient samples, this
density estimate can be biased. This has also motivated the
development of one-class classification methods that aim to
estimate subfamilies [221] or single level sets [6], [7], [183],
[222] directly, which we will explain in section IV in more
detail.
7) Threshold vs. Score: The previous approach to level
set estimation through density estimation is more costly, yet
generally results in a more informative model that can rank
inliers and anomalies according to their estimated density. In
comparison, a pure threshold detector as in (4) only yields
a binary prediction. Menon and Williamson [223] propose
a compromise by learning a density outside the level set
boundary. Many anomaly detection methods also target some
strictly increasing transformation T : [0,∞) → R of the
density for estimating a model (e.g., log-likelihood instead of
likelihood). The resulting target T (p(x)) is often no longer
a proper density but still preserves the density order [224],
[225]. An anomaly score s : X → R can then be defined by
using an additional order-reversing transformation, for exam-
ple s(x) = −T (p(x)) (e.g., negative log-likelihood), so that
high scores reflect low density values and vice versa. Having
such a score that indicates the ‘degree of anomalousness’ is
important in many anomaly detection applications. As for the
density in (5), of course, we can always derive a threshold
from the empirical distribution of anomaly scores if needed.
8) Selecting a Level α: As we will show, there are many
degrees of freedom when attacking the anomaly detection
problem outlined in this section which inevitably requires
making various modeling assumptions and choices. Setting the
level α is one of these choices and depends on the specific
application. As the value of α increases, the anomaly detector
focuses only on the most likely regions of P. Such a detector
can be desirable in applications where missed anomalies are
costly (e.g., in medical diagnosis or fraud detection). On the
other hand, a large α will result in high false alarm rates,
which can be undesirable in online settings where lots of
data is generated (e.g., in monitoring tasks). We will provide
practical guidelines for selecting α in Section VIII. Choosing
α also involves further assumptions about the data-generating
process P, which we have assumed here to match the normal
data distribution P+. In the next section, we discuss the data
settings that can occur in anomaly detection that may alter this
assumption.
C. Dataset Settings and Data Properties
The dataset settings and data properties that occur in real-
world anomaly detection problems can be diverse. We here
characterize these settings which may range from the most
common unsupervised to a semi-supervised as well as a super-
vised setting and list further data properties that are relevant
for modeling an anomaly detection problem. But before we
elaborate on these, we first observe that the assumptions made
about the distribution of anomalies (often implicitly) are also
crucial to the problem.
1) A Distribution of Anomalies?: Let P- denote the ground-
truth anomaly distribution also on X ⊆ RD. As mentioned
above, the common concentration assumption implies that
some high-density regions of the normal data distribution are
concentrated whereas anomalies are assumed to be not con-
centrated [210], [211]. This assumption may be modeled by
an anomaly distribution P- that follows a uniform distribution
over the (bounded2) data space X [183]. Some well-known
unsupervised methods such as KDE [12] or the OC-SVM [6],
for example, implicitly make this assumption that P- follows
a uniform which can be interpreted as a default uninformative
2Strictly speaking, we here assume that there always exists some data-
enclosing hypercube of numerically meaningful values such that the data space
X is bounded and the uniform distribution is well-defined.
6prior on the anomalous distribution [211]. This prior assumes
that there are no anomalous modes and that anomalies are
equally likely to occur over the valid data space X . Semi-
supervised or supervised anomaly detection approaches often
depart from this uninformed prior and try to make a more
informed a-priori assumption about the anomalous distribution
P- [211]. If faithful to P-, such a model based on a more
informed anomaly prior can achieve better detection perfor-
mance. Modeling anomalous modes also can be beneficial in
certain applications, for example, for typical failure modes in
industrial machines or known disorders in medical diagnosis.
We remark that these prior assumptions about the anomaly
distribution P- are often expressed only implicitly in the
literature, though such assumptions are critical to an anomaly
detection model.
2) The Unsupervised Setting: The unsupervised anomaly
detection setting is the case in which only unlabeled data
x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X (6)
is available for training a model. This setting is arguably
the most common setting in anomaly detection [159], [161],
[165], [168]. We will usually assume that the data points
have been drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from the data-generating
distribution P. For simplicity, we have so far assumed that
the data-generating distribution is the same as the normal
data distribution P ≡ P+. This is often summarized by the
statement that the training data is ‘clean’. In practice, however,
the data-generating distribution P might be subject to noise and
contamination [183].
Noise, in the classical sense, is some inherent source of
randomness ε that is added to the actual signal in the data-
generating process, that is, samples from P have added noise
x+ε where x ∼ P+. Noise might be present due to irreducible
measurement uncertainties in an application, for example. The
greater the noise, the harder it becomes to accurately estimate
the ground-truth level sets of P+, since characteristic normal
features get obfuscated [165]. This is because added noise
generally expands the regions covered by the observed data in
input space X . A standard assumption about noise is that it is
symmetric and unbiased E[ε] = 0.
In addition to noise, the contamination or pollution of the
unlabeled data with undetected anomalies is another critical
source of disturbance. For instance, some unnoticed anoma-
lous errors of a machine might have already occurred during
the data collection process. In this case the data-generating
distribution P is a mixture of the normal data and the anomaly
distribution, i.e., P ≡ (1−η)P++ η P- for some contamination
or pollution rate η ∈ (0, 1). The greater the contamination,
the more likely the normal data decision boundary will be
damaged by including the anomalous points.
In summary, a more general and realistic assumption is
that samples from the the data-generating distribution P have
the form of x + ε where x ∼ (1 − η)P+ + η P- and ε is
random noise. Assumptions on both, the noise distribution ε
and contamination rate η, are crucial for modeling a specific
anomaly detection problem. Robust methods [5], [126], [226]
specifically aim to account for these sources of disturbance.
Note also that by increasing the level α in the density level
set definition above, a corresponding model generally becomes
more robust, since the target decision boundary becomes
tighter and excludes the contamination.
3) The Semi-Supervised Setting: The semi-supervised
anomaly detection setting is the case in which both unlabeled
and labeled data
x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X and (x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m) ∈ X ×Y (7)
are available for training a model with Y = {±1}, where
we denote y˜ = +1 for normal and y˜ = −1 for anomalous
points respectively. Usually, we have m  n in the semi-
supervised setting, that is, mainly unlabeled and only a few
labeled instances are available, since labels are often costly
to obtain in terms of resources (time, money, etc.). Labeling
might for instance require domain experts such as medical
professionals (e.g., pathologists) or technical experts (e.g.,
aerospace engineers). Anomalous instances in particular are
also infrequent by nature (e.g., rare medical conditions) or
very expensive (e.g., the failure of some industrial machine).
The deliberate generation of anomalies is rarely an option.
However, including known anomalous examples, if available,
can significantly improve the detection performance of a model
[143], [183], [227]–[230]. Labels are also sometimes available
in the online setting where alarms raised by the anomaly de-
tector have been investigated to determine whether they were
correct. Some unsupervised anomaly detection methods can
be incrementally updated when such labels become available
[231]. Verifying unlabeled samples as indeed being normal can
often be easier due to the more frequent nature of normal data.
For this reason, among others, the special semi-supervised case
of Learning from Positive and Unlabeled Examples (LPUE)
[232]–[234], i.e., labeled normal and unlabeled examples, is
also studied specifically in the anomaly detection literature
[148], [161], [235]–[237].
Previous work [161] has also referred to the special case
of learning exclusively from positive examples as the semi-
supervised anomaly detection setting, which is confusing
terminology. Although meticulously curated normal data can
sometimes be available (e.g., in open category detection
[238]), such a setting in which entirely (and confidently)
labeled normal examples are available is rather rare in practice.
The analysis of this setting is rather again justified by the
assumption that most of the given (unlabeled) training data
is normal, but not the absolute certainty thereof. This makes
this setting effectively equivalent to the unsupervised setting
from a modeling perspective, apart from maybe weakened
assumptions on the level of noise or contamination, which
previous works also point out [161]. We therefore refer to the
more general setting as presented in (7) as the semi-supervised
anomaly detection setting, which incorporates both labeled
normal as well as anomalous examples in addition to unlabeled
instances, since this setting is relevant and occurs in practice.
If some labeled anomalies are available, the modeling as-
sumptions about the anomalous distribution P-, as mentioned
in section II-C1, become critical for effectively incorporating
anomalies into training. These include for instance whether
modes or clusters are expected among the anomalies (e.g.,
group anomalies).
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TABLE I
DATA PROPERTIES RELEVANT IN ANOMALY DETECTION.
Data Property Description
Size n+m Is scalability in dataset size critical? Are there labeled
samples (m > 0) for (semi-)supervision?
Dimension D Low- or high-dimensional? Truly high-dimensional or
embedded in some higher dimensional ambient space?
Type Continuous, discrete, or categorical?
Scales Are features uni- or multi-scale?
Modality Uni- or multi-modal (classes and clusters) distribution?
Convexity Is the data support convex or non-convex?
Correlation Are features (linearly or non-linearly) correlated?
Manifold Has the data a (linear, locally linear, or non-linear)
subspace or manifold structure? Are there invariances
(translation, rotation, etc.)?
Hierarchy Is there a natural feature hierarchy (e.g., images,
video, text, speech, etc.)? Are low-level or high-level
(semantic) anomalies relevant?
Context Are there contextual features (e.g., time, space, se-
quence, graph, etc.)? Can anomalies be contextual?
Stationarity Is the distribution stationary or non-stationary? Is a
domain or covariate shift expected?
Noise Is the noise level ε large or small? Is the noise type
Gaussian or more complex?
Contamination Is the data contaminated with anomalies? What is the
contamination rate η?
4) The Supervised Setting: The supervised anomaly detec-
tion setting is the case in which completely labeled data
(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m) ∈ X × Y (8)
is available for training a model, where again Y = {±1}
with y˜ = +1 denoting normal instances and y˜ = −1 denoting
anomalies respectively. If both the normal and anomalous data
points are assumed to be representative for the normal data
distribution P+ and anomaly distribution P- respectively, this
learning problem is equivalent to supervised binary classifica-
tion. Such a setting would thus not be an anomaly detection
problem in the strict sense, but rather a classification task.
Although anomalous modes or clusters might exist, i.e., some
anomalies might be more likely to occur than others, anything
not normal is by definition an anomaly. Labeled anomalies
are therefore rarely representative of some ‘anomaly class’.
This distinction is also reflected in modeling: whereas in
classification the objective is to learn a (well generalizing)
decision boundary that best separates the data according to
some (closed set of) class labels, the objective in anomaly
detection remains the estimation of the normal density level
set boundaries. Hence, we should interpret supervised anomaly
detection problems as label-informed density level set estima-
tion in which confident normal (in-distribution) and anomalous
(out-of-distribution) training examples are available. Due to
the costs that are usually involved with labeling, as mentioned
before, the supervised anomaly detection setting is the most
uncommon setting in practice.
5) Further Data Properties: Besides the settings described
above, the intrinsic properties of the data itself are also crucial
for modeling a specific anomaly detection problem. We give
a list of relevant data properties in Table I and present a toy
Ground-truth normal law P+ Observed data from P = P+ + ε
Fig. 4. A two-dimensional Big Moon, Small Moon toy example with real-
valued ground-truth normal law P+ that is composed of two one-dimensional
manifolds (bimodal, two-scale, non-convex). The unlabeled training data (n =
1,000, m = 0) is generated from P = P++ε which is subject to Gaussian noise
ε. This toy data is non-hierarchical, context-free, and stationary. Anomalies
are off-manifold points that may occur uniformly over the displayed range.
dataset with a specific realization of these properties in Fig. 4
which will serve us as a running example. The assumptions
about these properties should be reflected in the modeling
choices such as adding context or deciding among suitable
deep or shallow feature maps which can be challenging. We
outline these and further challenges in anomaly detection next.
D. Challenges in Anomaly Detection
We conclude our introduction by briefly highlighting some
notable challenges in anomaly detection, some of which di-
rectly arise from the definition and data characteristics de-
tailed above. Certainly, the fundamental challenge in anomaly
detection is the mostly unsupervised nature of the problem,
which necessarily requires assumptions to be made about the
specific task, the domain, and the given data. These include
assumptions about the relevant types of anomalies (cf., II-B2),
possible prior assumptions about the anomaly distribution (cf.,
II-C1) and, if available, the challenge of how to incorporate
labeled data instances in a generalizing way (cf., II-C3 and
II-C4). Further questions include if a specific task requires
an anomaly score or a threshold (cf., II-B7)? What level α
(cf., II-B8) strikes a balance between false alarms and missed
anomalies that is reasonable for the task? Is the data-generating
process subject to noise or contamination (cf., II-C2), i.e.
is robustness a critical aspect? Moreover, identifying and
including the data properties given in Table I into a method
and model can pose challenges as well. The computational
complexity in both the dataset size n+m and dimensionality D
as well as the memory cost of a model at training time, but also
at test time can be a limiting factor (e.g., for data streams or in
real-time monitoring). Is the data-generating process assumed
to be non-stationary [239]–[241] and are there distributional
shifts expected at test time? For (truly) high-dimensional
data, the curse of dimensionality and resulting concentration
of distances can be a major issue [165]. Here, finding a
representation that captures the features that are relevant for
the task and meaningful for the data and domain becomes vital.
Deep anomaly detection methods further entail new challenges
such as an increased number of hyperparameters, for example
the selection of a suitable network architecture or specification
of optimization parameters (learning rate, batch sizes, etc.).
In addition, the more complex the data or a model is, the
greater the challenges of interpretability (e.g., [242]–[245]),
8transparency, and explaining anomalies become. We illustrate
these various practical challenges and provide guidelines with
worked-through examples in section VIII.
Given all these facets of the anomaly detection problem
we covered in this introduction, it is not surprising that there
is such a wealth of literature and approaches on the topic.
We turn to these approaches in the following sections, where
we first examine density estimation and probabilistic models
(section III), followed by one-class classification methods
(section IV), and finally reconstruction models (section V). In
these sections, we will point out the connections between deep
and shallow methods. Afterwards, we present our unifying
view in section VI, which will enable us to systematically
identify open challenges and paths for future research.
III. DENSITY ESTIMATION AND PROBABILISTIC MODELS
The first category of methods predict anomalies by taking
the intermediate step of estimating the whole probability dis-
tribution. A wealth of existing probability models are therefore
direct candidates for the task of anomaly detection. This
includes classic density estimation methods [246] as well as
deep statistical models. In the following, we describe the
adaptation of these techniques to anomaly detection.
A. Classic Density Estimation
One of the most basic approaches to multivariate anomaly
detection is to compute the Mahalanobis distance from a test
point to the training data mean [247]. This is equivalent to
fitting a multivariate Gaussian distribution to the training data
and evaluating the log-likelihood of a test point according
to that model [248]. Compared to modeling each dimension
of the data independently, fitting a multivariate Gaussian
can capture linear interactions between multiple dimensions.
To model more complex distributions, nonparametric density
estimators have been introduced, including kernel density esti-
mators (KDE) [12], [246], histogram estimators, and Gaussian
mixture models (GMMs) [249], [250]. The kernel density esti-
mator is arguably the most widely used nonparametric density
estimator due to theoretical advantages over histograms [251]
and the practical issues with fitting and parameter selection
for GMMs [252]. The standard kernel density estimator, along
with a more recent adaptation that can deal with modest levels
of outliers in the training data [253], [254], is therefore a
popular approach to anomaly detection.
While classic nonparametric density estimators perform
fairly well for low dimensional problems, they suffer no-
toriously from the curse of dimensionality: the sample size
required to attain a fixed level of accuracy grows exponentially
in the dimension of the feature space. One goal of deep
statistical models is to overcome this challenge.
B. Energy-Based Models
Some of the earliest deep statistical models are energy based
models (EBMs) [255]–[257]. An EBM is a model whose
density is characterized by an energy function Eθ(x) as
pθ(x) =
1
Z(θ)
exp (−Eθ(x)) , (9)
where Z(θ) =
∫
exp (−Eθ(x)) dx is the so-called partition
function that ensures that pθ integrates to 1. These models
are typically trained via gradient descent, and approximating
the log-likelihood gradient ∇θ log pθ(x) via Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) [258] or Stochastic Gradient Langevin
Dynamics (SGLD) [259], [260]. While one typically cannot
evaluate the density pθ directly due to the intractability of
the partition function Z(θ), the function Eθ can be used as
an anomaly score since it is monotonically decreasing as the
density pθ increases.
Early deep EBMs such as Deep Belief Networks [261]
and Deep Boltzmann Machines [262] are graphical models
consisting of layers of latent states followed by an observed
output layer that models the training data. Here, the energy
function depends not only on the input x, but also on the
latent state z so the energy function has the form Eθ(x, z).
While these approaches can richly model latent probabilistic
dependencies in data distributions, they are not particularly
amenable to anomaly detection since one must marginalize
out the latent variables to recover some value related to
the likelihood. Later works replaced the probabilistic latent
layers with deterministic ones [263] allowing for the practical
use of Eθ(x) as an anomaly score. This sort of model has
been successfully used for deep anomaly detection [145].
Recently, EBMs have also been suggested as a framework to
reinterpret deep classifiers where the energy-based training has
shown to improve robustness and out-of-distribution detection
performance [260].
C. Neural Generative Models (VAEs and GANs)
Neural generative models aim to learn a neural network
that maps vectors sampled from a simple predefined source
distribution Q, usually a Gaussian or uniform distribution,
to the actual input distribution P+. More formally, the ob-
jective is to train the network so that φω (Q) ≈ P+ where
φω (Q) is the distribution that results from pushing the source
distribution Q forward through neural network φω . The two
most established neural generative models are variational
autoencoders (VAEs) [264]–[266] and generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [267].
1) VAEs: A variational autoencoder learns a deep latent-
variable model where the data points x are parameterized
on latent samples z ∼ Q via some neural network so it
learns a distribution pθ(x | z) such that pθ(x) ≈ p+(x). For
example, a common instantiation of this is to let Q be an
isotropic multivariate Gaussian distribution and let the neural
network φd,ω = (µω,σω) (the decoder) with weights ω,
parameterize the mean and variance of an isotropic Gaussian,
so pθ(x | z) ∼ N (x;µω(z),σ2ω(z)I). Performing maximum
likelihood estimation on θ is typically intractable. To remedy
this an additional neural network φe,ω′ (the encoder) is in-
troduced to parameterize a variational distribution qθ′(z |x),
with θ′ encapsulated by the output of φe,ω′ , to approximate
the latent posterior p(z |x). The full model is then optimized
via the evidence lower bound (ELBO) in a variational Bayes
manner:
max
θ,θ′
−DKL (qθ′(z|x)‖p(z))+Eqθ′ (z|x) [log pθ(x|z)] . (10)
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Optimization proceeds using Stochastic Gradient Variational
Bayes [264]. Given a trained VAE, one can estimate pθ(x) via
a Monte Carlo sampling from the prior p(z) and computing
Ez∼p(z) [pθ(x | z)]. Using this score directly for anomaly
detection has a nice theoretical interpretation, but experiments
have shown that it tends to perform worse [268], [269] than
alternatively using the reconstruction probability [270] which
conditions on x to estimate Eqθ′ (z|x) [log pθ (x|z)].
2) GANs: GANs pose the problem of learning the target
distribution as a zero-sum-game: a generative model is trained
in competition with an adversary that challenges it to gen-
erate samples whose distribution is similar to the training
distribution. A GAN consists of two neural networks, a
generator network φω : Z → X and a discriminator network
ψω′ : X → (0, 1) which are pitted against each other so that
the discriminator is trained to discriminate between φω(z) and
x ∼ P+ where z ∼ Q. The generator is trained to fool the
discriminator network thereby encouraging the generator to
produce samples more similar to the target distribution. This
is done using the following objective:
min
ω
max
ω′
Ex∼P+ [logψω′(x)]
+ Ez∼Q [log(1− ψω′(φω(z)))] .
(11)
Training is typically done via an alternating optimization
scheme which is notoriously finicky [271]. There exist many
GAN variants, including the Wasserstein GAN [272], [273],
which is frequently used for anomaly detection methods using
GANs, and StyleGAN, which has produced impressive high-
resolution photorealistic images [274].
Due to their construction, GAN models offer no way to
assign a likelihood to points in the input space. Using the
discriminator directly has been suggested as one approach
to use GANs for anomaly detection [137]. Other approaches
apply optimization to find a point z˜ in latent space Z such that
x˜ ≈ φω(z˜) for a test point x˜. The authors of AnoGAN [51]
recommend using an intermediate layer of the discriminator,
fω′ , and setting the anomaly score to be a convex combination
of the reconstruction loss ‖x˜−φω(z˜)‖ and the discrimination
loss ‖fω′(x˜) − fω′(φω(z˜))‖. In AD-GAN [147], the authors
recommend initializing the search for latent points multiple
times to find a collection of m latent points z˜1, . . . , z˜m
while simultaneously adapting the network parameters ωi
individually for each z˜i to improve the reconstruction and
using the mean reconstruction loss as an anomaly score:
1
m
m∑
i=1
‖x˜− φωi(z˜i)‖. (12)
Other adaptations include an encoder network which is trained
to find the latent point z˜ and is used in a variety of ways,
usually incorporating the reconstruction error [57], [148],
[151], [152].
D. Normalizing Flows
Like neural generative models, normalizing flows [275]–
[277] attempt to map data points from a source distribution
z ∼ Q (usually called base distribution for normalizing flows)
so that x := φω(z) is distributed according to p+. The crucial
Gauss (AUC=74.3) KDE (AUC=81.8) RealNVP (AUC=96.3)
Fig. 5. Density estimation models on the Big Moon, Small Moon toy example
(cf., Fig. 4). The parametric Gauss model is limited to an ellipsoidal (convex,
unimodal) density. KDE with a RBF kernel is more flexible, yet tends to
underfit the (multi-scale) distribution due a uniform kernel scale. RealNVP is
the most flexible model, yet flow architectures induce biases as well, here a
connected support caused by affine coupling layers in RealNVP.
distinguishing characteristic of normalizing flows is that the
latent samples are D-dimensional, so they have the same
dimensionality as the input space, and the network consists
of L layers φi,ωi : RD → RD so φω = φL,ωL ◦ · · · ◦ φ1,ω1
where each φi,ωi is designed to be invertible for all ωi,
thereby making the entire network invertible. The benefit of
this formulation is that the probability density of x can be
calculated exactly via a change of variables
px(x) = pz(φ
−1
ω (x))
L∏
i=1
∣∣det Jφ−1i,ωi (xi)∣∣ (13)
where xL = x and xi = φ−1i+1 ◦ · · · ◦ φ−1L (x) otherwise.
normalizing flow models are typically optimized to maximize
the likelihood of the training data. Evaluating each layer’s
Jacobian and its determinant can be very expensive for general
flow models. Consequently, the networks of flow models are
usually designed so that the Jacobian is guaranteed to be
upper (or lower) triangular, or have some other nice structure,
such that one does not need to compute the full Jacobian and
evaluating the determinant is efficient [275], [278], [279]; see
[280] for an application in physics.
An advantage of these models over other methods is that
one can calculate the likelihood of a point directly without any
approximation while also being able to sample reasonably ef-
ficiently. Because the density px(x) can be computed exactly,
normalizing flow models can be applied directly for anomaly
detection [281], [282].
A drawback of these models is that they do not perform any
dimensionality reduction, which argues against applying them
to images where the true (effective) dimensionality is much
smaller than the image dimensionality. It has been observed
that these models often assign high likelihood to anomalous
instances [269]. Despite present limits, we have included them
here because we believe that they may provide an elegant and
promising direction for future anomaly detection methods. We
will come back to this in our outlook in section IX.
E. Discussion
While we have focused on the case of density estimation on
i.i.d. samples of low dimensional data and images, it is worth
noting that there exist many deep statistical models for other
settings. When performing conditional anomaly detection, for
example, one can use GAN [283], VAE [284], and normal-
izing flow [285] variants which perform conditional density
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estimation. Likewise there exist many deep generative models
for virtually all data types including time series data [284],
[286], text [287], [288], and graphs [289]–[291], all of which
may potentially be used for anomaly detection.
It has been argued that full density estimation is not needed
for solving the anomaly detection problem, since one learns all
density level sets simultaneously when one really only needs
a single density level set. This violates Vapnik’s Principle:
“[W]hen limited amount of data is available, one should avoid
solving a more general problem as an intermediate step to
solve the original problem” [292]. The methods in the next
section seek to compute only a single density level set, that
is, they perform one-class classification.
IV. ONE-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
One-class classification [183], [222], [293]–[295], occasion-
ally also called single-class classification [296], [297], adopts
a discriminative approach to anomaly detection. Methods
based on one-class classification try to avoid a full estimation
of the density as an intermediate step. Instead, these methods
aim to directly learn a decision boundary that corresponds to
a desired density level set of the normal data distribution P+,
or more generally, to produce a decision boundary that yields
a low cost when applied to unseen data.
A. The One-Class Classification Objective
We can see one-class classification as a particularly tricky
classification problem, namely as binary classification where
we only have (or almost only have) access to data from
one class — the normal class. Given this imbalanced setting,
the one-class classification objective is to learn a one-class
decision boundary that minimizes (i) falsely raised alarms for
true normal instances (i.e., the false alarm rate or type I error),
and (ii) undetected or missed true anomalies (i.e., the miss rate
or type II error). Achieving a low (or zero) false alarm rate,
is conceptually simple: given enough normal data points, one
could just draw some boundary that encloses all the points,
for example a sufficiently large ball that contains all data
instances. The crux here is, of course, to simultaneously keep
the miss rate low, that is, to not draw this boundary too loosely.
For this reason, one usually a priori specifies some target false
alarm rate α ∈ [0, 1] for which the miss rate is then sought to
be minimized. Note that this precisely corresponds to the idea
of estimating an α-density level set for some a priori fixed
level α ∈ [0, 1]. The key question in one-class classification
thus is how to minimize the miss rate for some given target
false alarm rate with access to no (or only few) anomalies.
We can express the rationale above in terms of the binary
classification risk [211], [221]. Let Y ∈ {±1} be the class
random variable, where again Y = +1 denotes normal and
Y = −1 denotes anomalous points, so we can then identify the
normal data distribution as P+ ≡ PX|Y=+1 and the anomaly
distribution as P- ≡ PX|Y=−1 respectively. Furthermore, let
` : R×{±1} → R be a binary classification loss and f : X →
R be some real-valued score function. The classification risk
of scorer f under loss ` is then given by:
R(f) = EX∼P+ [`(f(X),+1)] + EX∼P- [`(f(X),−1)]. (14)
Minimizing the second term — the expected loss of classi-
fying true anomalies as normal — corresponds to minimiz-
ing the (expected) miss rate. Given some unlabeled data
x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X , and potentially some additional labeled
data (x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m), we can apply the principle of
empirical risk minimization to obtain
min
f
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(f(xi),+1) +
1
m
m∑
j=1
`(f(x˜j), y˜j) +R. (15)
This solidifies the empirical one-class classification objective.
Note that the second term is an empty sum in the unsupervised
setting. Without any additional constraints or regularization,
the empirical objective (15) would then be ill-posed. We add
R as an additional term to denote and capture regularization
which may take various forms depending on the assumptions
about f , but critically also about P-. Generally, the regular-
ization R = R(f) aims to minimize the miss rate (e.g., via
volume minimization and assumptions about P-) and improve
generalization (e.g., via smoothing of f ). Further note, that
the pseudo-labeling of y = +1 in the first term incorporates
the assumption that the n unlabeled training data points are
normal. This assumption can be adjusted, however, through
specific choices of the loss (e.g., hinge) and regularization. For
example, requiring some fraction of the unlabeled data to get
misclassified to include an assumption about the contamination
rate η or achieve some target false alarm rate α as we will see
below.
B. One-Class Classification in Input Space
As an illustrative example that conveys useful intuition,
consider the previous simple idea of fitting a data-enclosing
ball as a one-class model. Given x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X , we can
define the following objective:
min
R,c,ξ
R2 +
1
νn
n∑
i=1
ξi
s.t. ‖xi − c‖2 ≤ R2 + ξi, ξi ≥ 0, ∀i.
(16)
In words, we aim to find a hypersphere with radius R > 0
and center c ∈ X that encloses the data (‖xi − c‖2 ≤ R2).
To control the miss rate, we minimize the volume of this
hypersphere by minimizing R2 to achieve a tight spherical
boundary. Slack variables ξi ≥ 0 allow some points to fall
outside the sphere, thus making the boundary soft, where
hyperparameter ν ∈ (0, 1] balances this trade-off.
Objective (16) exactly corresponds to Support Vector Data
Description (SVDD) applied in the input space X , motivated
above as in [7], [183], [222]. Equivalently, we can derive
(16) from the binary classification risk. Consider the (shifted,
cost-weighted) hinge loss `(s, y) defined by `(s,+1) =
1
1+ν max(0, s) and `(s,−1) = ν1+ν max(0,−s) [221]. Then,
for a hypersphere model fθ(x) = ‖x − c‖2 − R2 with
parameters θ = (R, c), the corresponding classification risk
objective (14) is given by
min
θ
EX∼P+ [max(0, ‖X − c‖2 −R2)]
+ ν EX∼P- [max(0, R2 − ‖X − c‖2)].
(17)
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We can estimate the first term in (17) empirically from
x1, . . . ,xn, again assuming (most of) these points have been
drawn from P+. If labeled anomalies are absent, we can still
make an assumption about their distribution P-. Following
the basic, uninformed prior assumption that anomalies may
occur uniformly on X (i.e., P- ≡ U(X )), we can examine the
expected value in the second term analytically:
EX∼U(X )[max(0, R2 − ‖X − c‖2)]
=
1
λ(X )
∫
X
max(0, R2 − ‖x− c‖2) dλ(x)
≤ R2 λ(BR(c))
λ(X ) ∼ R
2,
(18)
where BR(c) denotes the ball centered at c with radius R
and λ is again the standard (Lebesgue) measure of volume.3
This shows that the minimum volume principle [217], [219]
naturally arises in one-class classification through seeking to
minimize the risk of missing anomalies, here illustrated for
an assumption that the anomaly distribution P- follows a
uniform distribution. Overall, from (17) we thus can derive
the empirical objective
min
R,c
R2 +
1
νn
n∑
i=1
max(0, ‖xi − c‖2 −R2), (19)
which corresponds to (16) with the constraints directly incor-
porated into the objective function. We remark that the cost-
weighting hyperparameter ν ∈ (0, 1] is purposefully chosen
here, since it is an upper bound on the ratio of points outside
and a lower bound on the ratio of points inside or on the
boundary of the sphere [6], [136]. We can therefore see ν as
an approximation of the false alarm rate, that is ν ≈ α.
A sphere in the input space X is of course a very limited
model and only matches a limited class of distributions P+
(e.g., an isotropic Gaussian). Minimum Volume Ellipsoids
(MVE) [178], [298] and the Minimum Covariance Deter-
minant (MCD) estimator [299] are a generalization to non-
isotropic distributions with elliptical support. Nonparametric
methods such as One-Class Neighbor Machines [300] provide
additional freedom to model multi-modal distributions having
non-convex support. Extending the objective and principles
above to general feature spaces (e.g., [210], [292], [301]) fur-
ther increases the flexibility of one-class models and enables
decision boundaries for more complex distributions.
C. Kernel-based One-Class Classification
The kernel-based OC-SVM [6], [302] and SVDD [7],
[183] are perhaps the most well-known one-class classification
methods. Let k : X × X → R be some positive semi-definite
(PSD) kernel with associated RKHS Fk and corresponding
feature map φk : X → Fk, so k(x, x˜) = 〈φk(x), φk(x˜)〉
for all x, x˜ ∈ X . The objective of (kernel) SVDD is again
to find a data-enclosing hypersphere of minimum volume.
The SVDD primal problem is the one given in (16), but
with the hypersphere model fθ(x) = ‖φk(x) − c‖2 − R2
3Again note that we assume λ(X ) < ∞ here, i.e., that the data space X
can be bounded to numerically meaningful values.
defined in feature space Fk instead. In comparison, the OC-
SVM objective is to find a hyperplane w ∈ Fk that separates
the data in feature space Fk with maximum margin from the
origin:
min
w,ρ,ξ
1
2
‖w‖2 − ρ+ 1
νn
n∑
i=1
ξi
s.t. ρ− 〈φk(xi),w〉 ≤ ξi, ξi ≥ 0, ∀i.
(20)
So the OC-SVM uses a linear model fθ(x) = ρ−〈φk(x),w〉
in feature space Fk with model parameters θ = (w, ρ). The
margin to the origin is given by ρ‖w‖ which is maximized via
maximizing ρ, where ‖w‖ acts as a normalizer.
The OC-SVM and SVDD both can be solved in their
respective dual formulations which are quadratic programs that
only involve dot products (the feature map φk is implicit).
For the standard Gaussian kernel (or any kernel with constant
norm k(x,x) = c > 0), the OC-SVM and SVDD are
equivalent [183]. In this case, the corresponding density level
set estimator defined by
Cˆν = {x ∈ X | fθ(x) < 0} (21)
is in fact an asymptotically consistent ν-density level set
estimator [303]. The solution paths of hyperparameter ν have
been analyzed for both the OC-SVM [304] and SVDD [305].
Kernel-induced feature spaces considerably improve the
expressive power of one-class methods and allow to learn well-
performing models in multi-modal, non-convex, and non-linear
data settings. Many variants of kernel one-class classification
have been proposed and studied over the years such as hier-
archical formulations for nested density level set estimation
[306], [307], Multi-Sphere SVDD [308], Multiple Kernel
Learning for OC-SVM [309], [310], OC-SVM for group
anomaly detection [196], boosting via L1-norm regularized
OC-SVM [311], One-class Kernel Fisher Discriminants [312]–
[314], Bayesian Data Description [315], or robust variants
[316].
D. Deep One-Class Classification
Selecting kernels and hand-crafting relevant features can be
challenging and quickly become impractical for complex data.
Deep one-class classification methods aim to overcome these
challenges by learning meaningful neural network feature
maps φω : X → Z from the data or transferring such networks
from related tasks. Deep SVDD [136], [143], [144], [317] and
deep OC-SVM variants [135], [223] employ a hypersphere
model fθ(x) = ‖φω(x)−c‖2−R2 and linear model fθ(x) =
ρ−〈φω(x),w〉 with explicit neural feature maps φω(·) in (16)
and (20) respectively. These methods are typically optimized
with Stochastic Gradient Descent variants [318], [319], which,
combined with GPU parallelization, makes them scale to large
datasets.
As a simpler variant compared to using a neural hypersphere
model in (16), the One-Class Deep SVDD [136], [320] has
been introduced which poses the following objective:
min
ω,c
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖φω(xi)− c‖2 +R. (22)
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Fig. 6. One-class classification models on the Big Moon, Small Moon toy
example (cf., Fig. 4). A Minimum Volume Ellipsoid (MVE) in input space
is limited to enclose an ellipsoidal, convex region. By (implicitly) fitting
a hypersphere in kernel feature space, SVDD enables non-convex support
estimation. Deep SVDD learns an (explicit) neural feature map (here with
smooth ELU activations) that extracts multiple data scales to fit a hypersphere
model in feature space for support description.
Here, the neural network transformation φω(·) is learned to
minimize the mean squared distance over all data points to
center c ∈ Z . Optimizing this simplified objective has been
found to converge faster and be effective in many situations
[136], [143], [143]. In light of our unifying view, we will see
that we may also interpret One-Class Deep SVDD as a single-
prototype deep learning method (cf., sections V-A2 and V-D).
A recurring question in deep one-class classification is how
to meaningfully regularize against a feature map collapse
φω ≡ c. Without regularization, minimum volume or max-
imum margin objectives such as (16), (20), or (22) could
be trivially solved with a constant mapping [136], [321].
Possible solutions for this include reconstruction or architec-
tural constraints [136], [317], freezing the embedding [135],
[138], [139], [141], [322], inversely penalizing the embedding
variance [323], using true [143], [324], auxiliary [138], [320],
[325], [326], or artificial [326] negative examples in training,
pseudo-labeling [153], [154], [156], [323], or integrating some
manifold assumption [321]. Further variants include multi-
modal extensions [144] and methods that employ adversarial
learning [137], [140], [327] or transfer learning [138], [141].
Deep one-class classification methods generally offer a
greater modeling flexibility and enable learning or transfer of
task-relevant features for complex data. They usually require
more data to be effective though, or must rely on some
informative domain prior (e.g., some pre-trained network).
The underlying principle of one-class classification methods —
targeting a discriminative one-class boundary in learning —
remains unaltered, regardless of whether a deep or shallow
feature map is used.
E. Negative Examples
One-class classifiers can usually incorporate labeled nega-
tive examples (y = −1) in a direct manner due to their close
connection to binary classification as explained above. Such
negative examples can facilitate an empirical estimation of
the miss rate (cf., (14) and (15)). We here recognize three
qualitative types of negative examples that have been studied
in the literature, that we distinguish as artificial, auxiliary, and
true negative examples which increase in their informativeness
in this order.
The idea to approach unsupervised learning problems
through generating artificial data points has been around for
some time (cf., section 14.2.4 in [328]). If we assume that the
anomaly distribution P- has some form that we can generate
examples from, one idea would be to simply train a binary
classifier to discern between the normal and the artificial
negative examples. For the uniform prior P- ≡ U(X ), this
approach yields an asymptotically consistent density level set
estimator [211]. Classification against uniformly drawn points
from a hypercube, however, quickly becomes ineffective in
higher dimensions. To improve over artificial uniform sam-
pling, more informed sampling strategies have been proposed
[329] such as resampling schemes [330], manifold sampling
[331], and sampling based on local density estimation [332],
[333] as well as active learning strategies [334]–[336]. Another
recent idea is to treat the enormous quantities of data that
are publicly available in some domains as auxiliary negative
examples [325], for example images from photo sharing sites
for computer vision tasks and the English Wikipedia for
NLP tasks. Such auxiliary examples provide more informative
domain knowledge, for instance about the distribution of
natural images or the English language in general, as opposed
to sampling random pixels or words. This approach, called
Outlier Exposure [325], which trains on known anomalies
can significantly improve deep anomaly detection performance
in some domains [154], [325]. Finally, the most informative
labeled negative examples are true anomalies, for example
verified by some domain expert. Access to even a few labeled
anomalies has been shown to improve detection performance
significantly [143], [183], [228]. There also have been active
learning algorithms proposed that include subjective user feed-
back (e.g., from an expert) to learn about the user-specific in-
formativeness of particular anomalies in an application [337].
V. RECONSTRUCTION MODELS
Models that are trained on a reconstruction objective
are among the earliest [338], [339] and most common
[180], [182] neural network approaches to anomaly detec-
tion. Reconstruction-based methods learn a model that is
optimized to well-reconstruct normal data instances, thereby
aiming to detect anomalies by failing to accurately reconstruct
them under the learned model. Most of these methods have
a purely geometric motivation (e.g., PCA or deterministic
autoencoders), yet some probabilistic variants reveal a con-
nection to density (level set) estimation. In this section, we
define the general reconstruction learning objective, highlight
common underlying assumptions, as well as present standard
reconstruction-based methods and discuss their variants.
A. The Reconstruction Objective
Let φθ : X → X ,x 7→ φθ(x) be a feature map from the data
space X onto itself that is composed of an encoding function
φe : X → Z (the encoder) and a decoding function φd :
Z → X (the decoder), that is, φθ ≡ (φd ◦φe)θ where θ holds
the parameters of both the encoder and decoder. We call Z
the latent space and φe(x) = z the latent representation (or
embedding or code) of x. The reconstruction objective then
is to learn φθ such that φθ(x) = φd(φe(x)) = xˆ ≈ x, that
is, to find some encoding and decoding transformation so that
x is reconstructed with minimal error, usually measured in
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Euclidean distance. Given unlabeled data x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X ,
the reconstruction objective is given by
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖xi − (φd ◦ φe)θ(xi)‖2 +R, (23)
where R again denotes the different forms of regularization
that various methods introduce, for example on the parameters
θ, the structure of the encoding and decoding transformations,
or the geometry of latent space Z . Without any restrictions,
the reconstruction objective (23) would be optimally solved by
the identity map φθ ≡ id, but then of course nothing would
be learned from the data. In order to learn something useful,
structural assumptions about the data-generating process are
therefore necessary. We here identify two principal assump-
tions: the manifold and the prototype assumptions.
1) The Manifold Assumption: The manifold assumption
asserts that the data lives (approximately) on some lower-
dimensional (possibly non-linear and non-convex) manifold
M that is embedded within the data space X — that isM⊂ X
with dim(M) < dim(X ). In this case X is sometimes also
called the ambient or observation space. For natural images
observed in pixel space, for instance, the manifold captures
the structure of scenes as well as variation due to rotation
and translation, changes in color, shape, size, texture, and so
on. For human voices observed in audio signal space, the
manifold captures variation due to the words being spoken
as well as person-to-person variation in the anatomy and
physiology of the vocal folds. The (approximate) manifold
assumption implies that there exists a lower-dimensional latent
space Z and functions φe : X 7→ Z and φd : Z 7→ X
such that for all x ∈ X , x ≈ φd(φe(x)). Consequently,
the generating distribution P can be represented as the push-
forward through φd of a latent distribution PZ . Equivalently,
the latent distribution PZ is the push-forward of P through φe.
The goal of learning is therefore to learn the pair of
functions φe and φd so that φd(φe(X )) ≈M ⊂ X . Methods
that incorporate the manifold assumption usually restrict the
latent space Z ⊆ Rd to have much lower dimensionality d than
the data space X ⊆ RD (i.e., d D). The manifold assump-
tion is also widespread in related unsupervised learning tasks
such as manifold learning itself [340], [341], dimensionality
reduction [3], [342]–[344], disentanglement [209], [345], and
representation learning in general [80], [346].
2) The Prototype Assumption: The prototype assumption
asserts that there exists a finite number of prototypical ele-
ments in the data space X that characterize the data well. We
can model this assumption in terms of a data-generating dis-
tribution that depends on a discrete latent categorical variable
Z ∈ Z = {1, . . . ,K} that captures some K prototypes or
modes of the data distribution. This prototype assumption is
also common in clustering and classification when we assume
a collection of prototypical instances represent clusters or
classes well. With the reconstruction objective under the proto-
type assumption, we aim to learn an encoding function that for
x ∈ X identifies a φe(x) = k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and a decoding
function k 7→ φd(k) = ck that maps to some k-th prototype (or
some prototypical distribution or mixture of prototypes more
generally) such that the reconstruction error ‖x−ck‖ becomes
minimal. In contrast to the manifold assumption where we aim
to describe the data by some continuous mapping, under the
(most basic) prototype assumption we characterize the data by
a discrete set of vectors {c1, . . . , cK} ⊆ X . The method of
representing a data distribution by a set of prototype vectors
is also known as Vector Quantization (VQ) [347], [348].
3) The Reconstruction Anomaly Score: A model that is
trained on the reconstruction objective must extract salient
features and characteristic patterns from the data in its en-
coding — subject to imposed model assumptions — so that its
decoding from the compressed latent representation achieves
low reconstruction error (e.g., feature correlations and depen-
dencies, recurring patterns, cluster structure, statistical redun-
dancy, etc.). Assuming that the training data x1, . . . ,xn ∈
X includes mostly normal points, we therefore expect a
reconstruction-based model to produce a low reconstruction
error for normal instances and a high reconstruction error for
anomalies. For this reason, the anomaly score is usually also
directly defined by the reconstruction error:
s(x) = ‖x− (φd ◦ φe)θ(x)‖2. (24)
For models that have learned some truthful manifold structure
or prototypical representation, a high reconstruction error
would then detect off-manifold or non-prototypical instances.
Most reconstruction methods do not follow any probabilistic
motivation, and a point x gets flagged anomalous simply
because it does not conform to its ‘idealized’ representation
φd(φe(x)) = xˆ under the encoding and decoding process.
However, some reconstruction methods also have probabilistic
interpretations, for instance PCA [349], or are even derived
from probabilistic objectives such as Bayesian PCA [350] or
VAEs [264]. Such methods are again related to density (level
set) estimation (under specific assumptions about some latent
structure), usually in the sense that a high reconstruction error
indicates low density regions and vice versa.
B. Principal Component Analysis
A common way to formulate the Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) objective is to seek an orthogonal basis W
in data space X ⊆ RD that maximizes the empirical variance
of the (centered) data x1, . . . ,xn ∈ X :
max
W
n∑
i=1
‖Wxi‖2 s.t. WW> = I. (25)
Solving this objective results in a well-known eigenvalue prob-
lem, since the optimal basis is given by the eigenvectors of the
empirical covariance matrix where the respective eigenvalues
correspond to the component-wise variances [351]. The d ≤ D
components that explain most of the variance — the principal
components — are then given by the d eigenvectors that have
the largest eigenvalues.
Several works have adapted PCA for anomaly detection
[77], [352]–[357], which can be considered the default re-
construction baseline. From a reconstruction perspective, the
objective to find an orthogonal projection W>W to a d-
dimensional linear subspace (which is the case for W ∈ Rd×D
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with WW> = I) such that the mean squared reconstruction
error is minimized,
min
W
n∑
i=1
‖xi −W>Wxi‖2 s.t. WW> = I, (26)
yields exactly the same PCA solution. So PCA optimally
solves the reconstruction objective (23) for a linear encoder
φe(x) = Wx = z and transposed linear decoder φd(z) =
W>z with constraint WW> = I . For linear PCA, we can also
readily identify its probabilistic interpretation [349], namely
that the data distribution follows from the linear transfor-
mation X = W>Z + ε of a d-dimensional latent Gaussian
Z ∼ N (0, I), possibly with added noise ε ∼ N (0, σ2I), so
that P ≡ N (0,W>W + σ2I). Maximizing the likelihood of
this Gaussian over the encoding and decoding parameter W
again yields PCA as the optimal solution [349]. Hence, PCA
assumes the data lives on a d-dimensional ellipsoid embedded
in data space X ⊆ RD. Standard PCA therefore provides
an illustrative example for the connections between density
estimation and reconstruction.
Of course linear PCA is limited to data encodings that
can only exploit linear feature correlations. Kernel PCA [3]
introduced a non-linear generalization of component analysis
by extending the PCA objective to non-linear kernel feature
maps and taking advantage of the ‘kernel trick’. For a PSD
kernel k(x, x˜) with feature map φk : X → Fk, kernel PCA
solves the reconstruction objective (26) in feature space Fk,
min
W
n∑
i=1
‖φk(xi)−W>Wφk(xi)‖2 s.t. WW> = I, (27)
which results in an eigenvalue problem of the kernel matrix
[3]. For kernel PCA, the reconstruction error can again serve
as an anomaly score. It can be computed implicitly via the
dual [4]. This reconstruction from linear principal compo-
nents in feature space Fk corresponds to a reconstruction
from some non-linear subspace or manifold in input space
X [358]. Replacing the reconstruction W>Wφk(x) in (27)
with a prototype c ∈ Fk yields a reconstruction model that
considers the squared error to the kernel mean, since the
prototype is optimally solved by c = 1n
∑n
i=1 φ(xi) for the
L2-distance. For RBF kernels, this prototype model is (up to a
multiplicative constant) equivalent to kernel density estimation
[4], which provides a link between kernel reconstruction and
nonparametric density estimation methods. Finally, Robust
PCA variants have been introduced as well [359]–[362], which
extend PCA to account for data contamination or noise (cf.,
II-C2).
C. Autoencoders
Autoencoders are reconstruction models that use neural
networks for the encoding and decoding of data. They were
originally introduced during the 80s [363]–[366] primarily as
methods to perform non-linear dimensionality reduction [367],
[368], yet they have also been studied early on for anomaly
detection [338], [339]. Today, deep autoencoders are among
the most widely adopted methods for deep anomaly detection
in the literature [44], [52], [55], [124]–[134] likely owing
PCA (AUC=66.8) kPCA (AUC=94.0) AE (AUC=97.9)
Fig. 7. Reconstruction models on the Big Moon, Small Moon toy example
(cf., Fig. 4). PCA finds the linear subspace with the lowest reconstruction error
under an orthogonal projection of the data. Kernel PCA solves (linear) compo-
nent analysis in kernel feature space which enables an optimal reconstruction
from (kernel-induced) non-linear components in input space. An autoencoder
(AE) with one-dimensional latent code learns a one-dimensional, non-linear
manifold in input space having minimal reconstruction error.
to their long history and easy-to-use standard variants. The
standard autoencoder objective is given by
min
ω
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖xi − (φd ◦ φe)ω(xi)‖2 +R, (28)
where the optimization is carried out over the neural network
weights ω of the encoder and decoder. A common way to
regularize autoencoders is by mapping to a lower dimensional
‘bottleneck’ representation φe(x) = z ∈ Z through the
encoder network, which enforces data compression and effec-
tively limits the dimensionality of the manifold or subspace to
be learned. If linear networks are used, such an autoencoder
in fact recovers the same optimal subspace as spanned by
the PCA eigenvectors [369], [370]. Apart from a ‘bottleneck’,
a number of different ways to regularize autoencoders have
been introduced in the literature. Following ideas of sparse
coding [371]–[374], sparse autoencoders [375], [376] regu-
larize the (possibly higher-dimensional, over-complete) latent
code towards sparsity, for example via L1 Lasso penalization
[377]. Denoising autoencoders (DAEs) [378], [379] explicitly
feed noise-corrupted inputs x˜ = x + ε into the network
which is then trained to reconstruct the original inputs x.
DAEs thus provide a way to specify a noise model for ε
(cf., II-C2), which has been applied for noise-robust acoustic
novelty detection [42], for instance. For situations in which
the training data is already corrupted with noise or unknown
anomalies, robust deep autoencoders [126], which split the
data into well-represented and corrupted parts similar to robust
PCA [361], have been proposed. Contractive autoencoders
(CAEs) [380] propose to penalize the Frobenius norm of the
Jacobian of the encoder activations with respect to the inputs
to obtain a smoother and more robust latent representation.
Such ways of regularization influence the geometry and shape
of the subspace or manifold that is learned by an autoencoder,
for example by imposing some degree of smoothness or
introducing invariances towards certain types of input cor-
ruptions or transformations [130]. Hence, these regularization
choices should again reflect the specific assumptions of a given
anomaly detection task.
Besides the deterministic variants above, probabilistic au-
toencoders have also been proposed, which again establish
a connection to density estimation. The most explored class
of probabilistic autoencoders are Variational Autoencoders
(VAEs) [264]–[266], as introduced in section III-C1 through
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the lens of neural generative models, which approximately
maximize the data likelihood (or evidence) by maximizing
the evidence lower bound (ELBO). From a reconstruction
perspective, VAEs adopt a stochastic autoencoding process,
which is realized by encoding and decoding the parameters of
distributions (e.g., Gaussians) through the encoder and decoder
networks, from which the latent code and reconstruction then
can be sampled. For a standard Gaussian VAE, for example,
where q(z|x) ∼ N (µx,diag(σ2x)), p(z) ∼ N (0, I), and
p(x|z) ∼ N (µz, I) with encoder φe,ω′(x) = (µx,σx) and
decoder φd,ω(z) = µz , the empirical ELBO objective (10)
becomes
min
ω,ω′
1
n
n∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
[
1
2‖xi − µzij‖2
+DKL
(N (zij ;µxi ,diag(σ2xi))‖N (zij ;0, I)) ],
(29)
where zi1, . . . ,ziM are M Monte Carlo samples drawn from
the encoding distribution z ∼ q(z|xi) of xi. Hence, such a
VAE is trained to minimize the mean reconstruction error over
samples from an encoded latent Gaussian that is regularized
to be close to a standard isotropic Gaussian. VAEs have been
used in various forms for anomaly detection [268], [270],
[381], for instance on multimodal sequential data with LSTM
networks for anomaly detection in robot-assisted feeding [382]
and for new physics mining at the Large Hadron Collider
[74]. Another class of probabilistic autoencoders that has been
applied to anomaly detection are Adversarial Autoencoders
(AAEs) [44], [52], [383]. By employing an adversarial loss to
regularize and match the latent encoding distribution, AAEs
can employ any arbitrary prior p(z), as long as sampling is
feasible.
Finally, other autoencoder variants that have been applied
to anomaly detection include RNN-based autoencoders [193],
[230], [384], [385], convolutional autoencoders [55], autoen-
coder ensembles [125], [385] and variants that actively control
the topology of the latent code [386]. Autoencoders also
have been employed in two-step approaches that utilize au-
toencoders for dimensionality reduction and apply traditional
methods on the learned embeddings [135], [387], [388].
D. Prototypical Clustering
Clustering methods that make the prototype assumption
provide another approach to reconstruction-based anomaly
detection. As mentioned above, the reconstruction error here
is usually given by the distance of a point to its nearest pro-
totype, which ideally has been learned to represent a distinct
mode of the normal data distribution. Prototypical clustering
methods [389] include the well-known Vector Quantization
(VQ) algorithms k-means, k-medians, and k-medoids, which
define a Voronoi partitioning [390], [391] over the metric
space where they are applied — typically the input space X .
Kernel variants of k-means have also been studied [392] and
considered for anomaly detection [308]. More recently, deep
learning approaches to clustering have also been introduced
[393]–[396], some also based on k-means [397], and adopted
for anomaly detection [128], [387], [398]. As in deep one-class
classification (cf., section IV-D), a persistent question in deep
clustering is how to effectively regularize against a feature
map collapse [399]. Note that whereas for deep clustering
methods the reconstruction error is measured in latent space
Z , for deep autoencoders it is measured in the input space X
after decoding. Thus, a latent feature collapse (i.e., a constant
encoder φe ≡ c ∈ Z) would result in a constant decoding (the
data mean at optimum) for an autoencoder, which generally
is a suboptimal solution of (28). For this reason, autoencoders
seem less susceptible to a feature collapse, though they have
also been observed to converge to bad local optima under SGD
optimization, specifically if they employ bias terms [136].
VI. A UNIFYING VIEW OF ANOMALY DETECTION
In this section, we present a unifying view on the anomaly
detection problem. We identify specific anomaly detection
modeling components that allow us to organize and character-
ize the vast collection of discussed anomaly detection methods
in a systematic way. Importantly, this view shows connections
that enable the transfer of algorithmic ideas between existing
anomaly detection methods. Thus it reveals promising direc-
tions for future research such as transferring concepts and
ideas from kernel-based anomaly detection to deep methods
and vice versa.
A. Modeling Dimensions of the Anomaly Detection Problem
We identify the following five components or modeling
dimensions for anomaly detection:
D1 Loss ` : R× Y → R, (s, y) 7→ `(s, y)
D2 Model fθ : X → R,x 7→ fθ(x)
D3 Feature Map x 7→ φ(x)
D4 Regularization R(f, φ, θ)
D5 Inference Mode Frequentist or Bayesian θ ∼ p(θ)
Dimension D1 Loss is the (scalar) loss function that is
applied to the output of some model fθ(x). Semi-supervised or
supervised methods apply loss functions that also incorporate
labels, but for the many unsupervised anomaly detection
methods we usually have `(s, y) = `(s). D2 Model defines
the specific model fθ that maps an input x ∈ X to some scalar
value that is evaluated by the loss. We have aligned our previ-
ous three sections along this major modeling dimension where
we covered certain groups of methods that formulate models
based on common principles, namely probabilistic modeling,
one-class classification, and reconstruction. Due to the close
link between anomaly detection and density estimation (cf.,
II-B5), many of the methods formulate a likelihood model
fθ(x) = pθ(x | Dn) with negative log-loss `(s) = − log(s),
that is they have a negative log-likelihood objective, where
Dn = {x1, . . . ,xn} denotes the training data. Dimension D3
captures the Feature Map x 7→ φ(x) that is used in a model.
This could be an (implicit) feature map φk(x) defined by some
given kernel k, for example, or an (explicit) neural network
feature map φω(x) that is learned and parameterized with
network weights ω. With dimension D4 Regularization, we
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TABLE II
ANOMALY DETECTION METHODS IDENTIFIED WITH OUR UNIFYING VIEW (LAST COLUMN CONTAINS REPRESENTATIVE REFERENCES).
Method Loss `(s, y) Model fθ(x) Feature Map φ(x) Parameter θ Regularization R(f, φ, θ) Bayes? References
Parametric Density − log(s) p(x|θ) x (input) θ choice of density class {pθ | θ ∈ Θ} 7 [400], [401]
Gaussian/Mahalanobis − log(s) N (x|µ,Σ) x (input) (µ,Σ) – 7 [400], [401]
GMM − log(s) ∑k pikN (x|µk,Σk) x (input) (pi,µ,Σ) number of mixture components K latent [402]
KDE s ‖φk(x)− µ‖2 φk(x) (kernel) µ kernel hyperparameters (e.g., bandwidth h) 7 [249], [250]
EBMs − log(s) 1
Z(θ)
exp(−E(φ(x),z; θ)) (various) θ latent prior p(z) latent [145], [257]
Normalizing Flows − log(s) pz(φ−1ω (x)) | det Jφ−1ω (x)| φω(x) (neural) (ω) base distribution pz(z); diffeomorphism architecture 7 [276], [281]
GAN (D-based) − log(s) σ(〈w, ψω(x)〉) ψω(x) (neural) (w, ω) adversarial training 7 [57], [327]
Min. Vol. Sphere max(0, s) ‖x− c‖2 −R2 x (input) (c, R) νR2 7 [183]
Min. Vol. Ellipsoid max(0, s) (x− c)>Σ−1(x− c)−R2 x (input) (c, R,Σ) ν( 1
2
‖Σ‖2Fr +R2) 7 [299]
SVDD max(0, s) ‖φk(x)− c‖2 −R2 φk(x) (kernel) (c, R) νR2 7 [7]
Semi-Sup. SVDD max(0, ys) ‖φk(x)− c‖2 −R2 φk(x) (kernel) (c, R) νR2 7 [7], [228]
Soft Deep SVDD max(0, s) ‖φω(x)− c‖2 −R2 φω(x) (neural) (c, R, ω) νR2); weight decay; collapse reg. (various) 7 [136]
OC Deep SVDD s ‖φω(x)− c‖2 φω(x) (neural) (c, ω) weight decay; collapse reg. (various) 7 [136]
Deep SAD sy ‖φω(x)− c‖2 φω(x) (neural) (c, ω) weight decay 7 [143]
OC-SVM max(0, s) ρ− 〈w, φk(x)〉 φk(x) (kernel) (w, ρ) ν( 12‖w‖2 − ρ) 7 [6]
OC-NN max(0, s) ρ− 〈w, φω(x)〉 φω(x) (neural) (w, ρ, ω) ν( 12 (‖w‖2 − ρ); weight decay 7 [223]
Bayesian DD max(0, s) ‖φk(x)− c‖2 −R2 φk(x) (kernel) (c, R) c =
∑
i αiφk(xi) with prior α ∼ N (µ,Σ) fully [315]
GT − log(s) ∏k σk(〈w, φω(Tk(x))〉) φω(x) (neural) (w, ω) transformations T = {T1, . . . , TK} for self-labeling 7 [153], [154]
GOAD (CE) − log(s) ∏k σk(−‖φω(Tk(x))− ck‖2) φω(x) (neural) (c1, . . . , cK , ω) transformations T = {T1, . . . , TK} for self-labeling 7 [156]
BCE (supervised) −y log(s)− 1−y
2
log(1−s) σ(〈w, φω(x)〉) φω(x) (neural) (w, ω) weight decay 7 [320]
BNN (supervised) −y log(s)− 1−y
2
log(1−s) σ(〈w, φω(x)〉) φω(x) (neural) (w, ω) prior p(w, ω) fully [403], [404]
PCA s ‖x−W>Wx‖22 x (input) W WW> = I 7 [352]
Robust PCA s ‖x−W>Wx‖1 x (input) W WW> = I 7 [359]
Probabilistic PCA − log(s) N (x|0,W>W + σ2I) x (input) (W,σ2) linear latent Gauss model x = W>z + ε latent [349]
Bayesian PCA − log(s) N (x|0,W>W + σ2I) p(W |α) x (input) (W,σ2) linear latent Gauss model with prior p(W |α) fully [350]
Kernel PCA s ‖φk(x)−W>Wφk(x)‖2 φk(x) (kernel) W WW> = I 7 [3], [4]
Autoencoder s ‖x− φω(x)‖22 φω(x) (neural) ω advers. (AAE), contract. (CAE), denois. (DAE), etc. 7 [126], [134]
VAE − log(s) pφω (x|z) φω(x) (neural) ω latent prior p(z) latent [266], [270]
GAN (G-based) − log(s) pφω (x|z) φω(x) (neural) ω adversarial training and latent prior p(z) latent [51], [147]
k-means s ‖x− argminck ‖x− ck‖2‖22 x (input) (c1, . . . , cK) number of prototypes K 7 [389], [402]
k-medians s ‖x− argminck ‖x− ck‖1‖1 x (input) (c1, . . . , cK) number of prototypes K 7 [389]
VQ s ‖x− φd(argminck ‖φe(x)− ck‖)‖ (various) (c1, . . . , cK) number of prototypes K 7 [347], [348]
capture various forms of regularizationR(f, φ, θ) of the model
fθ, the feature map φ, and their parameters θ in a broader
sense. Note that θ here may include both model parameters
as well as feature map parameters, that is θ = (θf , θφ)
in general. θf could be the distributional parameters of a
parametric density model, for instance, and θφ the weights of
a neural network. Our last modeling dimension D5 describes
the Inference Mode, specifically whether a method performs
Bayesian inference [402].
The identification of the above modeling dimensions enables
us to formulate a general anomaly detection learning objective
that applies to a broad range of anomaly detection methods:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(fθ(xi), yi) +R(f, φ, θ). (∗)
Denoting the minimum of (∗) by θ∗, the anomaly score of a
test input x˜ is computed via the model fθ∗(x˜). In the Bayesian
case, when the objective in (∗) is the negative log-likelihood of
a posterior p(θ | Dn) induced by a prior distribution p(θ), we
can predict in a fully Bayesian fashion via the expected model
Eθ∼p(θ | Dn)fθ(x). We describe many well-known anomaly
detection methods within our unified view in Table II.
B. Distance-based Anomaly Detection
Our unifying view focuses on anomaly detection methods
that formulate some learning objective. Apart from these
methods, there also exists a rich literature on purely ‘distance-
based’ anomaly detection methods and algorithms that have
been studied extensively in the data mining community in
particular. Many of these algorithms follow a lazy learning
paradigm, in which there is no a priori training phase of
learning a model, but instead new test points are evaluated
with respect to the training instances only as they occur. We
here group these methods as ‘distance-based’ without further
granularity, but remark that various taxonomies for these types
of methods have been proposed [161], [179]. Examples of
such methods include nearest-neighbor-based methods [8], [9],
[405]–[407] such as LOF [10] and partitioning tree-based
methods [408] such as Isolation Forest [409], [410]. These
methods usually also aim to capture the high-density regions
of the data in some manner, for instance by scaling distances
in relation to local neighborhoods [10], and thus are mostly
consistent with the formal anomaly detection problem defini-
tion presented in section II. The majority of these algorithms
have been studied and applied in the original input space X .
Few of them have been considered in the context of deep
learning, but some hybrid anomaly detection approaches apply
distance-based algorithms on top of deep neural feature maps
from pre-trained networks (e.g., [411]).
VII. EVALUATION AND EXPLANATION
The theoretical considerations and unifying view above
provide useful insights about the characteristics and underly-
ing modeling assumptions of the different anomaly detection
methods. What matters the most to the practitioner, however,
is to evaluate how well an anomaly detection method performs
on real data. In this section, we present different aspects of
evaluation, in particular, the problem of building a dataset that
includes meaningful anomalies, and the problem of robustly
evaluating an anomaly detection model on the collected data.
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TABLE III
EXISTING ANOMALY DETECTION BENCHMARKS.
k-classes-out (Fashion-)MNIST, CIFAR-10, STL-10, ImageNet
Synthetic MNIST-C [413], ImageNet-C [414], ImageNet-P[414], ImageNet-O [419]
Real-world
Industrial: MVTec-AD [189], PCB [420]
Medical: CAMELYON16 [61], [421], NIH Chest X-
ray [61], [422], MOOD [423], HCP/BRATS [52],
Neuropathology [60], [424]
Security: Credit-card-fraud [425], URL [426], UNSW-
NB15 [427]
Time series: NAB [428], Yahoo [429]
Misc.: Emmott [418], ELKI [430], ODDS [431], UCI
[432], [433]
In a second step, we will look at the limitations of classical
evaluation techniques, specifically, their inability to directly
inspect and verify the exact strategy employed by some model
for detection, for instance, which input variables a model uses
for prediction. We then present ‘Explainable AI’ approaches
for enabling such deeper inspection of the model.
A. Building Anomaly Detection Benchmarks
Unlike standard supervised datasets, there is an intrinsic dif-
ficulty in building anomaly detection benchmarks: Anomalies
are rare and some of them may have never been observed
before they manifest themselves in practice. Existing anomaly
benchmarks typically rely on one of the following strategies:
1) k-classes-out: Start from a binary or multi-class dataset
and declare one or more classes to be normal and the
rest to be anomalous. Due to the semantic homogeneity
of the resulting ‘anomalies,’ such a benchmark may not
be a good simulacrum of real anomalies. For example,
simple low-level anomalies (e.g., additive noise) may not
be tested for.
2) Synthetic: Start from an existing supervised or unsu-
pervised dataset and generate synthetic anomalies (e.g.,
[412]–[414]). Having full control over anomalies is de-
sirable from a statistical view point, to get robust error
estimates. However, the characteristics of real anomalies
may be unknown or difficult to generate.
3) Real-world: Consider a dataset that contains anomalies
and have them labeled by a human expert. This is the
ideal case. In addition to the anomaly label, the human
can augment a sample with an annotation of which
exact features are responsible for the anomaly (e.g., a
segmentation mask in the context of image data).
We provide examples of anomaly detection benchmarks and
datasets falling into these three categories in Table III.
Although all three approaches are capable of producing
anomalous data, we note that real anomalies may exhibit much
wider and finer variations compared to those in the dataset.
In adversarial cases, anomalies may be designed maliciously
to avoid detection (e.g., in fraud and cybersecurity scenarios
[203], [335], [415]–[418]).
B. Evaluating Anomaly Detectors
Most applications come with different costs for false alarms
(type I error) and missed anomalies (type II error). Hence, it
is common to consider the decision function
decide
{
anomaly if s(x) ≥ τ
inlier if s(x) < τ, (30)
where s denotes the anomaly score, and adjust the decision
threshold τ in a way that (i) minimizes the costs associated to
the type I and type II errors on the collected validation data,
or (ii) accommodates the hard constraints of the environment
in which the anomaly detection system will be deployed.
To illustrate this, consider an example in financial fraud
detection: anomaly alarms are typically sent to a fraud ana-
lyst who must decide whether to open an investigation into
the potentially fraudulent activity. There is typically a fixed
number of analysts. Suppose they can only handle k alarms
per day, that is, the k examples with the highest predicted
anomaly score. In this scenario, the measure to optimize is
the ‘precision@k’, since we want to maximize the number of
anomalies contained in those k alarms.
In contrast, consider a credit card company that places an
automatic hold on a credit card when an anomaly alarm is
reported. False alarms result in angry customers and reduced
revenue, so the goal is to maximize the number of true alarms
subject to a constraint on the percentage of false alarms. The
corresponding measure is to maximize ‘recall@k’ — where k
is the number of false alarms.
However, it is often the case that application-related costs
and constraints are not fully specified or vary over time.
With such restrictions, it is desirable to have a measure that
evaluates the performance of anomaly detection models under
a broad range of possible application scenarios, or analogously,
a broad range of decision thresholds τ . The Area Under the
ROC Curve (AUROC or simply AUC) computes the fraction
of detected anomalies, averaged over the full range of decision
thresholds. AUC is the standard performance measure used
in anomaly detection [430], [434]–[437]. Another commonly
employed measure is the Area Under the Precision-Recall
Curve (AUPRC) [199].
C. A Comparison on MNIST-C and MVTec-AD
In the following, we apply the AUC measure to compare
a selection of anomaly detection methods from the three
major approaches (probabilistic, one-class, reconstruction) and
three types of feature representation (raw input, kernel, and
neural network). We perform the comparison on the synthetic
MNIST-C and real-world MVTec-AD datasets. MNIST-C is
MNIST extended with a set of fifteen types of corruptions
(e.g., blurring, added stripes, impulse noise, etc). MVTec-AD
consists of fifteen image sets from industrial production, where
anomalies correspond to manufacturing defects. These images
sometimes take the form of textures (e.g., wood, grid) or
objects (e.g., toothbrush, screw). For MNIST-C, models are
trained on the standard MNIST training set and then tested on
each corruption separately. We measure the AUC separating
the corrupted from the uncorrupted test set. For MVTec-AD,
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we train distinct models on each of the fifteen image sets and
measure the AUC on the corresponding test set. Results for
each model are shown in Tables IV and V. We provide the
training details of each model in Appendix B.
TABLE IV
AUC DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON MNIST-C.
Gauss MVE PCA KDE SVDD KPCA AGAN DOCC AE
brightness 100.0 99.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 13.7 100.0
canny edges 99.4 68.4 100.0 78.9 96.3 99.9 100.0 97.9 100.0
dotted line 99.9 62.9 99.3 68.5 70.0 92.6 91.5 86.4 100.0
fog 100.0 89.6 98.1 62.1 92.3 91.3 100.0 17.4 100.0
glass blur 79.5 34.7 70.7 8.0 49.1 27.1 100.0 31.1 99.6
impulse noise 100.0 69.0 100.0 98.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 97.5 100.0
motion blur 38.1 43.4 24.3 8.1 50.2 18.3 100.0 70.7 95.1
rotate 31.3 54.7 24.9 37.1 57.7 38.7 93.2 65.5 53.4
scale 7.5 20.7 14.5 5.0 36.5 19.6 68.1 79.8 40.4
shear 63.7 58.1 55.5 49.9 58.2 54.1 94.9 64.6 70.6
shot noise 94.9 43.2 97.1 41.6 63.4 81.5 96.7 51.5 99.7
spatter 99.8 52.6 85.0 44.5 57.3 64.5 99.0 68.2 97.4
stripe 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
translate 94.5 73.9 96.3 76.2 91.8 94.8 97.3 98.8 92.2
zigzag 99.9 72.5 100.0 84.0 87.7 99.4 98.3 94.3 100.0
TABLE V
AUC DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON MVTEC-AD.
Gauss MVE PCA KDE SVDD KPCA AGAN DOCC AE
Te
xt
ur
es
carpet 48.8 63.5 45.6 34.8 48.7 41.9 83.1 90.6 36.8
grid 60.6 67.8 81.8 71.7 80.4 76.7 91.7 52.4 74.6
leather 39.6 49.5 60.3 41.5 57.3 61.1 58.6 78.3 64.0
tile 68.5 79.7 56.4 68.9 73.3 63.2 74.1 96.5 51.8
wood 54.0 80.1 90.4 94.7 94.1 90.6 74.5 91.6 88.5
O
bj
ec
ts
bottle 78.9 67.0 97.4 83.3 89.3 96.3 90.6 99.6 95.0
cable 56.5 71.9 77.6 66.9 73.1 75.6 69.7 90.9 57.3
capsule 71.6 65.1 75.7 56.2 61.3 71.5 60.7 91.0 52.5
hazelnut 67.6 80.4 89.1 69.9 74.3 83.8 96.4 95.0 90.5
metal nut 54.7 45.1 56.4 33.3 54.3 59.0 79.3 85.2 45.5
pill 65.5 71.5 82.5 69.1 76.2 80.7 64.6 80.4 76.0
screw 53.5 35.5 67.9 36.9 8.6 46.7 99.6 86.9 77.9
toothbrush 93.9 76.1 98.3 93.3 96.1 98.3 70.8 96.4 49.4
transistor 70.2 64.8 81.8 72.4 74.8 80.0 78.8 90.8 51.2
zipper 50.1 65.2 82.8 61.4 68.6 81.0 69.7 92.4 35.0
A first striking observation is the heterogeneity in perfor-
mance of the various methods on the different corruptions and
defect classes. For example, the AGAN performs generally
well on MNIST-C but is systematically outperformed by the
Deep One-Class Classification model (DOCC) on MVTec-AD.
Also, the more powerful nonlinear models are not better on
every class, and simple ‘shallow’ models occasionally outper-
form their deeper counterparts. For instance, the simple Gaus-
sian model reaches top performance on MNIST-C:Spatter,
linear PCA ranks highest on MVTec-AD:Toothbrush, and
KDE ranks highest on MVTec-AD:Wood. The fact that some
of the simplest models sometimes perform well highlights
the strong differences in modeling structure of each anomaly
detection model.
However, what is still unclear is whether the measured
model performance faithfully reflects the performance on a
broader set of anomalies (i.e., the generalization performance)
or whether some methods only benefit from the specific
(possibly non-representative) types of anomalies that have
been collected in the test set. In other words, assuming
that all models achieve 100% test accuracy (e.g., MNIST-
C:stripes), can we conclude that all models will perform
well on a broader range of such anomalies? This problem
was already highlighted in the context of supervised learning,
and explanation methods can be applied to uncover potential
hidden weaknesses of models, also known as ‘Clever Hanses’
[244].
D. Explaining Anomalies
To gain further insight into the detection strategies used by
different anomaly models, and in turn to also address some
of the limitations of classical validation procedures, many
practitioners wish to augment anomaly predictions with an
‘explanation.’ Producing explanations of model predictions is
already common in supervised learning, and this field is often
referred to as Explainable AI (or XAI) [245]. Popular XAI
methods include LIME [438], (Guided) Grad-CAM [439],
integrated gradients [440], [441], and Layer-wise Relevance
Propagation (LRP) [442]. Grad-CAM and LRP rely on the
structure of the network to produce a robust explanation.
Explainable AI has recently also been brought to un-
supervised learning, in particular, anomaly detection [38],
[322], [326], [443]–[445]. Unlike supervised learning, which is
largely dominated by neural networks [81], [84], [446], state-
of-the-art methods for unsupervised learning are much more
heterogeneous, including neural networks but also kernel-
based, centroid-based, or probability-based models. In such
a heterogeneous setting, it is difficult to build explanation
methods that allow for a consistent comparison of detection
strategies of the multiple anomaly detection models. Two
directions to achieve such consistent explanations are particu-
larly promising:
1) Model-agnostic explanation techniques (e.g., sampling-
based) that apply transparently to any model, whether it
is a neural network or something different (e.g., [443]).
2) A conversion of non-neural network models into func-
tionally equivalent neural networks, or ‘neuralization’, so
that existing approaches for explaining neural networks,
e.g. LRP [442], can be applied [322], [445].
In the following, we demonstrate a neuralization approach.
It has been shown that numerous anomaly detection models,
in particular kernel-based models such as KDE or one-class
SVMs, can be rewritten as strictly equivalent neural networks
[322], [445]. Examples of neuralized models are shown in Fig.
8. They typically organize into a 3-layer architecture, from left
to right: feature extraction, distance computation, and pooling.
outlierness
AE
sm
in
NN
input
outlierness
input
input
outlierness
kernel density estimation (KDE)
Bag (KDE + DOCC)autoencoder reconstruction (AE)
NN
input
outlierness
deep one-class (DOCC)
sm
in sm
ax
Fig. 8. Three-stage neural network architecture that can be used to formulate
in a strictly equivalent manner a variety of non-neural-network anomaly
detection models.
For example, the KDE model, usually expressed as f(x) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 exp(−‖x−xi‖2), can have its negative log-likelihood
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s(x) = − log f(x) rewritten as a two-layer network:
hj = ‖x− xj‖2 + log n (layer 1)
s(x) = sminj{hj} (layer 2)
where smin is a soft min-pooling of the type logsumexp.
Once the model has been converted into a neural network,
we can apply explanation techniques such as LRP [442] to
produce an explanation of the anomaly prediction. In this case,
the LRP algorithm will take the score at the output of the
model, propagate to ‘winners’ in the pool, then assign the
score to directions in the input or feature space that contribute
the most to the distance, and if necessary propagate the signal
further down the feature hierarchy (cf., the Supplement of
[322] for how this is done exactly).
Fig. 9 shows from left to right an anomaly from the MNIST-
C dataset, the ground-truth explanation (the squared difference
between the digit before and after corruption) as well as
LRP explanations for three anomaly detection models (KDE,
DOCC, and AE).
Input Ground Truth KDE DOCC AE
Fig. 9. Explaining anomaly prediction: Highlighting the input features that
are most relevant for the prediction helps to understand the model’s decision
strategy, here on MNIST-C:Stripes.
Although all models predict accurately on the stripe data,
the strategies are very different: The kernel density estimator
highlights the anomaly, but also some regions of the digit itself.
The deep one-class classifier strongly emphasizes vertical
edges. The autoencoder produces a result similar to KDE but
with decision artifacts in the corners of the image and on the
digit itself.
From these observations, it is clear that each model, al-
though predicting with 100% accuracy on the current data,
will have different generalization properties and vulnerabilities
when encountering subsequent anomalies. (In section VIII-B
we will work through an example showing how explanations
can help to diagnose and improve a detection model.)
To conclude, we emphasize that a standard quantitative
evaluation can be imprecise or even misleading when the
available data is not fully representative, and in that case,
explanations can be produced to more comprehensively assess
the quality of an anomaly detection model.
VIII. WORKED-THROUGH EXAMPLES
In this section, we work through two specific, real-world
examples to exemplify the modeling and evaluation process
and provide some best practices.
A. Example 1: Thyroid Disease Detection
In the first example our goal is to learn a model to
detect thyroid gland dysfunctions such as hyperthyroidism.
The Thyroid dataset4 includes n = 3772 data instances and has
4Available from the ODDS Library [431] at http://odds.cs.stonybrook.edu/
D = 6 real-valued features. It contains a total of 93 (∼2.5%)
anomalies. For a quantitative evaluation, we consider a dataset
split of 60:10:30 corresponding to the training, validation, and
test sets respectively, while preserving the ratio of ∼2.5%
anomalies in each of the sets.
We choose the OC-SVM [6] with standard RBF kernel
k(x, x˜) = exp(−γ‖x− x˜‖2) as a method for this task since
the data is real-valued, low-dimensional, and the OC-SVM
scales sufficiently well for this comparatively small dataset. In
addition, the ν-parameter formulation (cf., Eq. (20)) enables
us to use our prior knowledge and thus approximately control
the false alarm rate α and with it implicitly also the miss rate,
which leads to our first recommendation:
Assess the risks of false alarms and missed anomalies
Calibrating the false alarm rate and miss rate of a detection
model can decide over life and death in a medical context
such as disease detection. Though the consequences must not
always be as dramatic as in a medical setting, it is important
to carefully consider the risks and costs involved with type I
and type II errors in advance. In our example, a false alarm
would suggest a thyroid dysfunction although the patient is
healthy. On the other hand, a missed alarm would occur if the
model recognizes a patient with a dysfunction as healthy. Such
asymmetric risks, with a greater expected loss for anomalies
that go undetected, are very common in medical diagnosis
[447]–[450]. Given only D = 6 measurements per data record,
we therefore seek to learn a detector with a miss rate ideally
close to zero, at the cost of an increased false alarm rate.
Patients falsely ascribed with a dysfunction by such a detector
could then undergo further, more elaborate clinical testing to
verify the disease. Assuming our data is representative and
∼12%5 of the population is at risk of thyroid dysfunction,
we choose a slightly higher ν = 0.15 to further increase
the robustness against potential data contamination (here the
training set contains ∼2.5% contamination in the form of
unlabeled anomalies). We then train the model and choose
the kernel scale γ according to the best AUC we observe
on the small, labeled validation set which includes 9 labeled
anomalies. We select γ from γ ∈ {(2iD)−1 | i = −5, . . . , 5},
that is from a log2 span that accounts for the dimensionality
D.
Following the above, we observe a rather poor best valida-
tion set AUC of 83.9% at γ = (2−5D)−1, which is the largest
value from the hyperparameter range. This is an indication
that we forgot an important preprocessing step, namely:
Apply feature scaling to normalize value ranges
Any method, including kernel methods, that relies on com-
puting distances requires the features to be scaled to similar
ranges to prevent features with wider value ranges from
dominating the computed distances. If this is not done, it can
cause anomalies that deviate on smaller scale features to be
undetected. Similar reasoning also holds for clustering and
classification (e.g., see discussions in [451] or [452]). Min-
max normalization or standardization are common choices,
5https://www.thyroid.org/
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but since we assume there may be some contamination, we
apply a robust feature scaling via the median and interquartile
range. Remember that scaling parameters should be computed
using only information from the training data and then applied
to all of the data. After we have scaled the features, we
observe a much improved best validation set AUC of 98.6%
at γ = (22D)−1. The so-trained and selected model finally
achieves a test set AUC of 99.2%, a false alarm rate of 14.8%
(i.e., close to our a priori specified ν = 0.15), and a miss rate
of zero.
B. Example 2: MVTec Industrial Inspection
For our second example, we consider the task of detect-
ing anomalies in wood images drawn from the MVTec-AD
dataset. Unlike the first worked-through example, the MVTec
data is high-dimensional and corresponds to arrays of pixel
values. Hence, all input features are already on a similar scale
(between −1 and +1) and therefore we do not need to apply
feature rescaling.
Following the standard model training / validation proce-
dure, we train a set of models on the training data, select
their hyperparameters on hold out data (e.g., a few inliers and
anomalies extracted from the test set), and then evaluate their
performance on the remaining part of the test set. The AUC
performance of the nine models in our benchmark is shown
in Table VI.
TABLE VI
AUC DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON THE MVTEC-AD ‘WOOD’ CLASS.
Gauss MVE PCA KDE SVDD kPCA AGAN DOCC AE
54.0 80.1 90.4 94.7 94.1 90.6 74.5 91.6 88.5
We observe that the best performing model is the kernel
density estimation (KDE). This is particularly surprising, be-
cause this model does not compute the kinds of higher-level
image features that deep models, such as DOCC, learn and
apply. Examination of the data set shows that the anomalies
involve properties such as small perforations and stains that
do not require high-level semantic information to be detected.
But is that the only reason why the KDE performance is so
high? In order to get insight into the strategy used by KDE
to arrive at its prediction, we employ the neuralization/LRP
approach presented in section VII-D.
Apply XAI to analyze model predictions
Fig. 10 shows an example of an image along with its
ground-truth pixel-level anomaly as well as the computed
pixel-wise explanation for KDE.
Ideally, we would like the model to make its decision
based on the actual anomaly (here, the three drill holes),
and therefore, we would expect the ground-truth annotation
and the KDE explanation to coincide. However, it is clear
from inspection of the explanation that KDE is not looking
at the true cause of the anomaly and is looking instead at the
vertical stripes present everywhere in the input image. This
discrepancy between the explanation and the ground truth can
be observed on other images of the ‘wood’ class. The high
Input Ground Truth KDE
Fig. 10. Input image, ground-truth source of anomaly (here, three drill holes),
and explanation of the KDE anomaly prediction. The KDE model assigns
high relevance to the wood strains instead of the drill holes. This discrepancy
between ground truth and model explanation reveals a ‘Clever Hans’ strategy
used by the KDE model.
AUC score of KDE thus must be due to a spurious correlation
in the test set between the reaction of the model to these
stripes and the presence of anomalies. We call this a ‘Clever
Hans’ effect [244], because just like the horse Clever Hans,
the model appears to work because of a spurious correlation.
Obviously the KDE model is unlikely to generalize well when
the anomalies and the stripes become decoupled (e.g., as we
observe more data or under some adversarial manipulation).
This illustrates the importance of generating explanations to
identify these kinds of failures. Once we have identified the
problem, how can we change our anomaly detection strategy
so that it is more robust and generalizes better?
Improve the model based on explanations
In practice, there are various approaches to improve the
model based on explanation feedback:
1) Data extension: We can extend the data with miss-
ing training cases, e.g., anomalous wood examples that
lack stripes or normal wood examples that have stripes
to break to spurious correlation between stripes and
anomalies. When further data collection is not possible,
synthetic data extension schemes such as blurring or
sharpening can also be considered.
2) Model extension: If the first approach is not sufficient,
or if the model is simply not capable of implementing
the necessary prediction structure, the model itself can be
changed (e.g., using a more flexible deep model). In other
cases, the model may have enough representation power
but is statistically inefficient (e.g., subject to the curse
of dimensionality). In that case, adding structure (e.g.,
convolutions) or regularization can also help to learn a
model with an appropriate prediction strategy.
3) Ensembles: If all considered models have their own
strengths and weaknesses, ensemble approaches can be
considered. Ensembles have a conceptual justification in
the context of anomaly detection [322], and they have
been shown to work well empirically [453], [454].
Once the model has been improved based on these strate-
gies, explanations can be recomputed and examined to verify
that the decision strategy has been corrected. If that is not the
case, the process can be iterated until we reach a satisfactory
model.
RUFF et al.: A UNIFYING REVIEW OF DEEP AND SHALLOW ANOMALY DETECTION 21
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS, OPEN CHALLENGES, AND
FUTURE RESEARCH PATHS
Anomaly detection is a blossoming field of broad theoretical
and practical interest across the disciplines. In this work,
we have given a review of the past and present state of
anomaly detection research, established a systematic unifying
view, and discussed many practical aspects. While we have
included some of our own contributions, we hope that we have
fulfilled our aim of providing a balanced and comprehensive
snapshot of this exciting research field. Focus was given to a
solid theoretical basis, which then allowed us put today’s two
main lines of development into perspective: the more classical
kernel world and the more recent world of deep learning and
representation learning for anomaly detection.
We will conclude our review by turning to what lies ahead.
Below, we highlight some critical open challenges — of which
there are many — and identify a number of potential avenues
for future research that we hope will provide useful guidance.
A. Unexplored Combinations of Modeling Dimensions
As can be seen in Fig. 1 and Table II, there is a zoo of differ-
ent anomaly detection algorithms that have historically been
explored along various dimensions. This review has shown
conceptual similarities between anomaly detection members
from kernel methods and deep learning. Note, however, that
the exploration of novel algorithms has been substantially
different in both domains, which offers unique possibilities
to explore new methodology: steps that have been pursued in
kernel learning but not in deep anomaly detection could be
transferred (or vice versa) and powerful new directions could
emerge. In other words, ideas could be readily transferred from
kernels to deep learning and back, and novel combinations in
our unified view in Fig. 1 would emerge.
Let us now discuss some specific opportunities to clarify
this point. Consider the problem of robustness to noise and
contamination. For shallow methods, the problem is well
studied, and we have many effective methods [5], [253],
[316], [359], [361], [362]. In deep anomaly detection, very
little work has addressed this problem. A second example
is the application of Bayesian methods. Bayesian inference
has been mostly considered for shallow methods [315], [350],
owing to the prohibitive cost or intractability of exact Bayesian
inference in deep neural networks. Recent progress in ap-
proximate Bayesian inference and Bayesian neural networks
[404], [455]–[458] raise the possibility of developing methods
that complement anomaly scores with uncertainty estimates
or uncertainty estimates of their respective explanations [459].
In the area of semi-supervised anomaly detection, ideas have
already been successfully transferred from kernel learning
[183], [228] to deep methods [143] for one-class classifica-
tion. But probabilistic and reconstruction methods that can
make use of labeled anomalies are unexplored. For time
series anomaly detection [169], [200]–[202], where forecasting
(i.e., conditional density estimation) models are practical and
widely deployed, semi-supervised extensions of such methods
could lead to significant improvements in applications in
which some labeled examples are available (e.g., learning from
failure cases in monitoring tasks). Concepts from density ratio
estimation [460] or noise contrastive estimation [461] could
lead to novel semi-supervised methods in principled ways.
Finally, active learning strategies for anomaly detection [334]–
[337], which identify informative instances for labeling, have
primarily only been explored for shallow detectors and could
be extended to deep learning approaches.
This is a partial list of opportunities that we have noticed.
Further analysis of our framework will likely expose additional
directions for innovation.
B. Bridging Related Lines of Research on Robustness
Other recent lines of research on robust deep learning are
closely related to anomaly detection or may even be interpreted
as special instances of the problem. These include out-of-
distribution detection, model calibration, uncertainty estima-
tion, and adversarial examples or attacks. Bridging these lines
of research by working out the nuances of the specific problem
formulations can be insightful for connecting concepts and
transferring ideas to jointly advance research.
A basic approach to creating robust classifiers is to endow
them with the ability to reject input objects that are likely to be
misclassified. This is known as the problem of classification
with a reject option, and it has been studied extensively [462]–
[468]. However, this work focuses on objects that fall near the
decision boundary where the classifier is uncertain.
One approach to making the rejection decision is to calibrate
the classification probabilities and then reject objects for which
no class is predicted to have high probability following Chow’s
optimal rejection rule [463]. Consequently, many researchers
have developed techniques for calibrating the probabilities
of classifiers [456], [469]–[474] or for Bayesian uncertainty
quantification [403], [404], [455], [457], [458], [475].
Recent work has begun to address other reasons for re-
jecting an input object. Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection
considers cases where the object is drawn from a distribution
different from the training distribution P+ [472], [474], [476]–
[479]. From a formal standpoint, it is impossible to determine
whether an input x is drawn from one of two distributions P1
and P2 if both distributions have support at x. Consequently,
the OOD problem reduces to determining whether x lies
outside regions of high density in P+, which is exactly the
anomaly detection problem we have described in this review.
A second reason to reject an input object is because it
belongs to a class that was not part of the training data.
This is the problem of open set recognition. Such objects
can also be regarded as being generated by a distribution P−,
so this problem also fits within our framework and can be
addressed with the algorithms described here. Nonetheless,
researchers have developed a separate set of methods for
open set recognition [238], [480]–[483], and an important
goal for future research is to evaluate these methods from
the anomaly detection perspective and to evaluate anomaly
detection algorithms from the open set perspective.
In rejection, out-of-distribution, and open set recognition
problems, there is an additional source of information that
is not available in standard anomaly detection problems: the
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class labels of the objects. Hence, the learning task combines
classification with anomaly detection. Formally, the goal is
to train a classifier on labeled data (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)
with class labels y ∈ {1, . . . , k} while also developing some
measure to decide whether an unlabeled test point x˜ should
be rejected (for any of the reasons listed above). The class
label information tells us about the structure of P+ and allows
us to model it as a joint distribution P+ ≡ PX,Y . Methods for
rejection, out-of-distribution, and open set recognition all take
advantage of this additional structure. Note that the labels y
are different from the labels that mark normal or anomalous
points in supervised or semi-supervised anomaly detection (cf.,
section II-C).
Research on the unresolved and fundamental issue of adver-
sarial examples and attacks [484]–[493] is related to anomaly
detection as well. We may interpret adversarial attacks as
extremely hard-to-detect out-of-distribution samples [456], as
they are specifically crafted to target the decision boundary
and confidence of a learned classifier. Standard adversarial
attacks find a small perturbation δ for an input x so that
x˜ = x + δ yields some class prediction desired by the
attacker. For instance, a perturbed image of a dog may be
indistinguishable from the original to the human’s eye, yet the
predicted label changes from ‘dog’ to ‘cat’. Note that such
an adversarial example x˜ still likely is (and probably should)
be normal under the data marginal PX (an imperceptibly
perturbed image of a dog shows a dog after all!) but the pair
(x˜, ‘cat’) should be anomalous under the joint PX,Y [494].
Methods for OOD detection have been found to also increase
adversarial robustness [154], [456], [479], [495], [496], some
of which model the class conditional distributions for detection
[478], [494], for the reason just described.
The above highlights the connection of these lines of re-
search towards the general goal of robust deep models. Hence,
we believe that connecting ideas and concepts in these lines
(e.g., the use of spherical losses in both anomaly detection
[136], [156] and OOD [495], [497]) may help them to advance
together. Finally, the assessment of the robustness of neural
networks and their fail-safe design and integration are topics of
high practical relevance that have recently found their way in
international standardization initiatives (e.g., ITU/WHO FG-
AI4H, ISO/IEC CD TR 24029-1, or IEEE P7009). Beyond
doubt, understanding the brittleness of deep networks (also in
the context of their explanations [498]) will also be critical for
their adoption in anomaly detection applications that involve
malicious attackers such as fraudsters or network intruders.
C. Interpretability and Trustworthiness
Much of anomaly detection research has been devoted to
developing new methods that improve detection accuracy. In
most applications, however, accuracy alone is not sufficient
[322], [499], and further criteria such as interpretability (e.g.,
[243], [500]) and trustworthiness [458], [501], [502] are
equally critical as demonstrated in sections VII and VIII.
For researchers and practitioners alike [503] it is vital to
understand the underlying reasons for how a specific anomaly
detection model reaches a particular prediction. Interpretable,
explanatory feedback enhances model transparency, which
is indispensable for accountable decision-making [504], for
uncovering model failures such as Clever Hans behavior [244],
[322], and for understanding model vulnerabilities that can be
insightful for improving a model or system. This is especially
relevant in safety-critical environments [505], [506]. Existing
work on interpretable anomaly detection has considered find-
ing subspaces of anomaly-discriminative features [443], [507]–
[511], deducing sequential feature explanations [444], the use
of feature-wise reconstruction errors [57], [189], utilizing fully
convolutional architectures [326], integrated gradients [38],
and explaining anomalies via LRP [322], [445]. In relation to
the vast body of literature though, research on interpretability
and trustworthiness in anomaly detection has seen compara-
tively little attention. The fact that anomalies may not share
similar patterns (i.e., the heterogeneity of anomalies) poses
a challenge for their explanation, which also distinguishes
this setting from interpreting supervised classification models.
Furthermore, anomalies might arise due to the presence of
abnormal patterns, but conversely also due to a lack of
normal patterns. While for the first case an explanation that
highlights the abnormal features is satisfactory, how should
an explanation for missing features be conceptualized? For
example given the MNIST dataset of digits, what should an
explanation of an anomalous all-black image be? The matters
of interpretability and trustworthiness get more pressing as
the task and data become more complex. Effective solutions of
complex tasks will necessarily require more powerful methods,
for which explanations become generally harder to interpret.
We thus believe that future research in this direction will be
imperative.
D. The Need for Challenging and Open Datasets
Challenging problems with clearly defined evaluation crite-
ria on publicly available benchmark datasets are invaluable
for measuring progress and moving a field forward. The
significance of the ImageNet database [512], together with cor-
responding competitions and challenges [513], for progressing
computer vision and supervised deep learning in the last
decade give a prime example of this. Currently, the standard
evaluation practices in deep anomaly detection [129], [134],
[136], [140], [143], [148], [153]–[156], [325], [514] out-of-
distribution detection [269], [472], [476]–[479], [515], [516],
and open set recognition [238], [480]–[483] still extensively
repurpose classification datasets by deeming some dataset
classes to be anomalous or considering in-distribution vs. out-
of-distribution dataset combinations (e.g., training a model on
Fashion-MNIST clothing items and regarding MNIST digits
to be anomalous). Although these synthetic protocols have
some value, it has been questioned how well they reflect
real progress on challenging anomaly detection tasks [199],
[320]. Moreover, we think the tendency that only few methods
seem to dominate most of the benchmark datasets in the
work cited above is alarming, since it suggests a bias towards
evaluating only the upsides of newly proposed methods, yet
often critically leaving out an analysis of their downsides and
limitations. This situation suggests a lack of diversity in the
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current evaluation practices and the benchmarks being used.
In the spirit of all models are wrong [517], we stress that more
research effort should go into studying when and how certain
models are wrong and behave like Clever Hanses. We need
to understand the trade-offs that different methods make. For
example, some methods are likely making a trade-off between
detecting low-level vs. high-level, semantic anomalies (cf.,
section II-B2 and [199]). The availability of more diverse and
challenging datasets would be of great benefit in this regard.
Recent datasets such as MVTec-AD [189] and competitions
such as the Medical Out-of-Distribution Analysis Challenge
[423] provide excellent examples, but the field needs many
more challenging open datasets to foster progress.
E. Weak Supervision and Self-Supervised Learning
The bulk of anomaly detection research has been studying
the problem in absence of any kind of supervision, that is,
in an unsupervised setting (cf., section II-C2). Recent work
suggests, however, that significant performance improvements
on complex detection tasks seem achievable through various
forms of weak supervision and self-supervised learning.
Weak supervision or weakly supervised learning describes
learning from imperfectly or scarcely labeled data [518]–
[520]. Labels might be inaccurate (e.g., due to labeling er-
rors or uncertainty) or incomplete (e.g., covering only few
normal modes or specific anomalies). Current work on semi-
supervised anomaly detection indicates that including even
only few labeled anomalies can already yield remarkable
performance improvements on complex data [61], [143], [320],
[324], [326], [521]. A key challenge here is to formulate
and optimize such methods so that they generalize well to
novel anomalies. Combining these semi-supervised methods
with active learning techniques helps identifying informative
candidates for labeling [334]–[337]. It is an effective strategy
for designing anomaly detection systems that continuously
improve via expert feedback loops [444], [522]. This approach
has not yet been explored for deep detectors, though. Outlier
exposure [325], that is, using massive amounts of data that
is publicly available in some domains (e.g., stock photos
for computer vision or the English Wikipedia for NLP) as
auxiliary negative samples (cf., section IV-E), can also be
viewed as a form of weak supervision (imperfectly labeled
anomalies). Though such negative samples may not coincide
with ground-truth anomalies, we believe such contrasting can
be beneficial for learning characteristic representations of
normal concepts in many domains (e.g., using auxiliary log
data to well characterize the normal logs of a specific computer
system [523]). So far, this has been little explored in applica-
tions. Transfer learning approaches to anomaly detection also
follow the idea of distilling more domain knowledge into a
model, for example, through using and possibly fine-tuning
pre-trained (supervised) models [138], [141], [322], [411],
[524]. Overall, weak forms of supervision or domain priors
may be essential for achieving effective solutions in semantic
anomaly detection tasks that involve high-dimensional data, as
has also been found in other unsupervised learning tasks such
as disentanglement [209], [525], [526]. Hence, we think that
developing effective methods for weakly supervised anomaly
detection will contribute to advancing the state of the art.
Self-supervised learning describes the learning of repre-
sentations through solving auxiliary tasks, for example, next
sentence and masked words prediction [111], future frame
prediction in videos [527], or the prediction of transformations
applied to images [528] such as colorization [529], cropping
[530], [531], or rotation [532]. These auxiliary prediction
tasks do not require (ground-truth) labels for learning and
can thus be applied to unlabeled data, which makes self-
supervised learning particularly appealing for anomaly de-
tection. Self-supervised methods that have been introduced
for visual anomaly detection train multi-class classification
models based on pseudo labels that correspond to various
geometric transformations (e.g., flips, translations, rotations,
etc.) [153]–[155]. An anomaly score can then be derived
from the softmax activation statistics of a so-trained clas-
sifier, assuming that a high prediction uncertainty (close to
a uniform) indicates anomalies. These methods have shown
significant performance improvements on the common k-
classes-out image benchmarks (cf., Table III). Bergman and
Hoshen [156] have recently proposed a generalization of this
idea to non-image data, called GOAD, which is based on
random affine transformations. We can identify GOAD and
self-supervised methods based on geometric transformations
(GT) as classification-based approaches within our unifying
view (cf., Table II). In a broader context, the interesting
question will be to what extent self-supervision can facili-
tate the learning of semantic representations. There is some
evidence that self-supervised learning helps to improve the
detection of semantic anomalies and thus exhibits inductive
biases towards semantic representations [199]. On the other
hand, there also exists evidence showing that self-supervision
mainly improves learning of effective feature representations
for low-level statistics [533]. Hence, this research question
remains to be answered, but bears great potential for many
domains where large amounts of unlabeled data are available.
F. Foundation and Theory
The recent progress in anomaly detection research has also
raised more fundamental questions. These include open ques-
tions about the out-of-distribution generalization properties
of various methods presented in this review, the definition
of anomalies in high-dimensional spaces, and information-
theoretic interpretations of the problem.
Nalisnick et al. [269] have recently observed that deep gen-
erative models (DGMs) such as normalizing flows, VAEs, or
autoregressive models (cf., section III) can often assign higher
likelihood to anomalies than to in-distribution samples. For
example, models trained on Fashion-MNIST clothing items
can systematically assign higher likelihood to MNIST digits
[269]. This counter-intuitive finding, which has been replicated
in subsequent work [149], [260], [325], [515], [516], [534],
revealed that there is a critical lack of theoretical understanding
of these models. Solidifying evidence [515], [516], [535],
[536] indicates that one reason seems to be that the likelihood
in current DGMs is still largely biased towards low-level
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background statistics. Consequently, simpler data points attain
higher likelihood (e.g., MNIST digits under models trained on
Fashion-MNIST, but not vice versa). Another critical remark in
this context is that for (truly) high-dimensional data, the region
with highest likelihood must not necessarily coincide with the
region of highest probability mass (called the ‘typical set’),
that is, the region where data points most likely occur [534].
For instance, while the highest density of a D-dimensional
standard Gaussian is given at the origin, points sampled
from the distribution concentrate around an annulus with
radius
√
D for large D [537]. Therefore, points close to the
origin have high density, but are very unlikely to occur. This
mismatch questions the standard theoretical density (level set)
problem formulation (cf., section II-B) and use of likelihood-
based anomaly detectors for some settings. Hence, theoretical
research aimed at understanding the above phenomenon and
DGMs themselves presents an exciting research opportunity.
Similar observations suggest that reconstruction-based mod-
els can systematically well reconstruct simpler out-of-
distribution points that sit within the convex hull of the
data. For example, an anomalous all-black image can be well
reconstructed by an autoencoder trained on MNIST digits
[538]. An even simpler example is the perfect reconstruction
of points the lie within the linear subspace spanned by the
principal components of a PCA model, even in regions far
away from the normal training data (e.g., along the prin-
cipal component in Fig. 7). While such out-of-distribution
generalization properties might be desirable for representa-
tion learning in general [539], such behavior critically can
be undesirable for anomaly detection. Therefore, we stress
that more theoretical research on understanding such out-of-
distribution generalization properties or biases, especially for
more complex models, will be necessary.
Finally, the push towards deep learning also presents new
opportunities to interpret and analyze the anomaly detection
problem from different theoretical angles. For example, from
the perspective of information theory [540], autoencoders can
be understood as adhering to the Infomax principle [541]–
[543] by implicitly maximizing the mutual information be-
tween the input and the latent code — subject to structural con-
straints or regularization of the code (e.g., ‘bottleneck’, latent
prior, sparsity, etc.) — via the reconstruction objective [378].
Similarly, information-theoretic perspectives of VAEs have
been formulated showing that these models can be viewed
as making a rate-distortion trade-off [544] when balancing
the latent compression (negative rate) and reconstruction ac-
curacy (distortion) [545], [546]. This view has recently been
employed to draw a connection between VAEs and Deep
SVDD, where the latter can be seen as a special case that
only seeks to minimize the rate (maximize compression) [547].
Overall, anomaly detection has been studied comparatively
less from an information-theoretic perspective [548], [549],
yet we think this could be fertile ground for building a
better theoretical understanding of representation learning for
anomaly detection.
Concluding, we firmly believe that anomaly detection in
all its exciting variants will also in the future remain an
indispensable practical tool in the quest to obtain robust
learning models that perform well on complex data.
APPENDIX A
NOTATION AND ABBREVIATIONS
For reference, we provide the notation and abbreviations
used in this work in Tables VII and VIII respectively.
TABLE VII
NOTATION CONVENTIONS
Symbol Description
N The natural numbers
R The real numbers
D The input data dimensionality D ∈ N
X The input data space X ⊆ RD
Y The labels Y = {±1} (+1 : normal; −1 : anomaly)
x A vector, e.g. a data point x ∈ X
Dn An unlabeled dataset Dn = {x1, . . . ,xn} of size n
P, p The data-generating distribution and pdf
P+, p+ The normal data distribution and pdf
P-, p- The anomaly distribution and pdf
pˆ An estimated pdf
ε An error or noise distribution
supp(p) The support of a data distribution P with density p,
i.e. {x ∈ X | p(x) > 0}
A The set of anomalies
Cα An α-density level set
Cˆα An α-density level set estimator
τα The threshold τα ≥ 0 corresponding to Cα
cα(x) The threshold anomaly detector corresponding to Cα
s(x) An anomaly score function s : X → R
1A(x) The indicator function for some set A
`(s, y) A loss function ` : R× {±1} → R
fθ(x) A model fθ : X → R with parameters θ
k(x, x˜) A kernel k : X × X → R
Fk The RKHS or feature space of kernel k
φk(x) The feature map φk : X → Fk of kernel k
φω(x) A neural network x 7→ φω(x) with weights ω
APPENDIX B
DETAILS OF TRAINING
For PCA, we compute the reconstruction error whilst main-
taining 90% of variance of the training data. We do the same
for kPCA, and additionally choose the kernel width such
that 50% neighbors capture 50% of total similarity scores.
For MVE, we use the fast minimum covariance determinant
estimator [299] with a default support fraction of 0.9 and a
contamination rate parameter of 0.01. To facilitate MVE com-
putation on MVTec-AD, we first reduce the dimensionality
via PCA retaining 90% of variance. For KDE, we choose the
bandwidth parameter to maximize the likelihood of a small
hold-out set from the training data. For SVDD, we consider
ν ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2} and select the kernel scale using
a small labeled hold-out set. The deep one-class classifier
applies a whitening transform on the representations after the
first fully-connected layer of a pre-trained VGG16 model (on
MVTec-AD) or a CNN classifier trained on the EMNIST
letter subset (on MNIST-C). For the AE on MNIST-C, we
use a LeNet-type encoder that has two convolutional layers
with max-pooling followed by two fully connected layers
that map to an encoding of 64 dimensions, and construct the
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TABLE VIII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Description
AE Autoencoder
AAE Adversarial Autoencoder
AUC Area Under the ROC curve
CAE Contrastive Autoencoder
DAE Denoising Autoencoder
DGM Deep Generative Model
DSVDD Deep Support Vector Data Description
DSAD Deep Semi-supervised Anomaly Detection
EBM Energy Based Model
ELBO Evidence Lower Bound
GAN Generative Adversarial Network
GMM Gaussian Mixture Model
GT Geometric Transformations
iForest Isolation Forest
KDE Kernel Density Estimation
k-NN k-Nearest Neighbors
kPCA Kernel Principal Component Analysis
LOF Local Outlier Factor
LPUE Learning from Positive and Unlabeled Examples
LSTM Long short-term memory
MCMC Markov chain Monte Carlo
MCD Minimum Covariance Determinant
MVE Minimum Volume Ellipsoid
OOD Out-of-distribution
OE Outlier Exposure
OC-NN One-Class Neural Network
OC-SVM One-Class Support Vector Machine
pPCA Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis
PCA Principal Component Analysis
pdf Probability density function
PSD Positive semidefinite
RBF Radial basis function
RKHS Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space
rPCA Robust Principal Component Analysis
SGD Stochastic Gradient Descent
SGLD Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics
SSAD Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection
SVDD Support Vector Data Description
VAE Variational Autoencoder
VQ Vector Quantization
XAI Explainable AI
decoder symmetrically. On MVTec-AD, we use an encoder-
decoder architecture as presented in [130] which maps to a
bottleneck of 512 dimensions. Both, the encoder and decoder
here consist of four blocks having two 3×3 convolutional
layers followed by max-pooling or upsampling respectively.
We train the AE such that the reconstruction error of a small
training hold-out set is minimized. For AGAN, we use the
AE encoder and decoder architecture for the discriminator and
generator networks respectively, where we train the GAN until
convergence to a stable equilibrium.
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